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4Introduction: Some Conceptual Apparatus
This essay is concerned with the moral-philosophical dimensions of development and
global poverty. To be more precise, the perspective adopted in the argument is the
perspective of political philosophy. Political philosophy’s approach to practical
political issues is a normative one, i.e. it is concerned with the question of what
principles and values should guide political action with regard to globally effective
policies, procedures and decisions. Moreover, it tries to address the question of how
global institutional arrangements must be designed to count as just ones. This essay
examines the two concepts of “justice” and “moral obligation” in order to construct an
argument that identifies the possession of central capabilities as the threshold of what
a just global institutional order must allow all societies to provide for its citizens. My
approach to the issue of global justice, “basic needs cosmopolitanism”, relates the
“capability approach” with the non-material (political, institutional, and social) and
the material prerequisites necessary to regard developing societies as being able to
provide their citizens with an environment that makes the possession of central
capabilities possible.
This essay’s first chapter is dedicated to the current debate about global justice
in general and the question of whether there are stringent moral obligations asking
better-off countries and their citizens to do something about world poverty. This
debate has been dominated by focusing on “positive duties”1 to help the poor in the
case of consequentialism and “imperfect obligations” to help in the case of Kantian
frameworks. The consequentialist’s positive obligation asks the obligation bearer to
actively contribute to the endeavour of improving the situation of the badly-off
members of the global population because it leads to the best overall consequences
and a higher level of aggregated well-being. These obligations are moral requirements
but they are not as stringent as negative obligations. Negative obligations are
universal moral requirements prohibiting certain (harmful) actions. The negative
obligation not to harm will play a crucial role in basic needs cosmopolitanism and in
establishing the claim according to which it depends on particular factual contexts
whether the positive obligation to help is one based on beneficence or, more
1 Thomas Pogge prefers to use the notions of “positive” and “negative duties”. I use a unified notion of
“obligation” instead of distinguishing between “duty” and “obligation”. Consequently, where Pogge
introduces his idea of better-off states and their citizens violating a “negative duty” I will use the notion
“negative obligation”.
5stringently, one on justice. In addition, the obligation to help (or better “compensate”)
the global poor can have a degree of stringency that is stronger than the one that the
Kantian category of imperfect obligations normally assigns to the obligation to
actively do something about other’s needs.
The concluding section of chapter one is dedicated to Thomas Pogge’s
criticism of the dominance of the positive obligations-framework in discussing global
justice. Pogge’s argument is that the better-off’s imposition of an unjust global
economic and political order on the poor constitutes the violation of a negative
obligation. Even sceptics about social and economic human rights agree that harming
someone, regardless of geographical distance and national boundaries, is morally
wrong. Pogge claims that stopping the imposition of unjust global political and
economic institutions, legal regimes and procedures is the primary obligation of
better-off societies. I adopt a positive stance towards Pogge’s emphasis on global
negative obligations. At two major points I deviate from his position though.
Firstly, I replace Pogge’s definition of an unjust global order in terms of
minimal social and economic human rights with an emphasis on basic needs. Whereas
Pogge’s argument identifies an unjust global order as one that renders the fulfilment
of basic human rights impossible, I claim that the global order is unjust in so far as it
makes the satisfaction of basic human needs impossible. Not being able to satisfy
one’s basic needs, due to other moral agent’s conduct, is an instance of inflicting
harm on the global poor. The notions of “injustice” and “harm” are linked by means
of basic needs, which are defined as the needs that have the property of resulting in
harm when they go unmet. Another defining property of “basic needs” is that they are
made up of two subgroups: firstly, the needs for living in a minimally just society, i.e.
a society and state that is committed to the goal of securing central capabilities for all
its citizens. Secondly, and this essay on global distributive justice is especially
concerned with this group, the needs to what I want to label “basic material
necessities”. Basic necessities are the material prerequisites access to which is the
other necessary precondition for possessing so-called “central human functional
capabilities”. Only a society that can meet both groups of basic needs can provide all
prerequisites for its citizens’ possessing central capabilities.
The second chapter is dedicated to Martha Nussbaum’s attempt to show that
these capabilities are of cross-cultural appeal, a feature being crucial for basic needs
6cosmopolitanism and its project of identifying a universal standard for judging the
justice of the global institutional order.
The second point where I deviate from Pogge is related to my idea according
to which the better-off have an obligation of justice – as opposed to a less stringent
obligation of beneficence – to do something about global poverty only when they
have contributed to the dire straits of the poor. Pogge’s positive proposal for the
eradication of poverty does not pay enough attention to this consequence of his
approach. He is right that the better-off have an obligation to stop imposing an unjust
global institutional order. In addition, however, this imposition has an impact on the
stringency of the better-off’s positive obligations to do something about world
poverty. Basic needs cosmopolitanism’s claim is that some positive obligations have
the same stringency as negative ones. That is why I call some positive obligations
“obligations of justice” and the compensation for the imposition of an unjust global
order is one of these positive obligations of justice.
In order to render these conceptual categorizations2 of global obligations more
transparent I present a coordinate grid of positive global obligations concerned with
material transfers from better-off to worse-off societies at the outset:
2 We are faced with three, double-sided, categories here: 1. Negative obligations vs. positive
obligations. 2. Perfect obligations vs. imperfect obligations. 3. Obligations of justice vs. obligations of
beneficence. In addition, as my “coordinate grid of positive global distributive obligations” shows,
there are subgroups within some types of these categories. The problem with discussing these
categories is that the three types of obligations are not congruent. It is one of my claims that some
positive obligations are obligations of justice and some are obligations of beneficence – this is a
“context-sensitive” approach to categorising global obligations. Moreover, it is difficult to find a place
for positive obligations of justice within the Kantian spectrum of perfect and imperfect obligations. I
discuss these issues below.
7Global Distributive Obligations
This essay’s dominating subject is category “A”. This is a positive obligation to do
something about global poverty. This does, however and contrary to what Pogge
believes, not imply that this positive obligation lacks the stringency characteristic for
negative obligations. Some positive obligations (namely categories “A” and “B”)
have the property of being of highest moral stringency because of their being linked
to the violation of (a) negative obligation(s). In the case of “A” it is the stringency of
the violation of the negative obligation not to harm someone (by means of rendering
the satisfaction of her basic needs impossible or difficult) that “spills over” to the
obligation to meet the harmed persons’ basic needs. In the case of “B” it is the
preceding violation of other negative obligations (not to coerce, not to deceive, etc.)
that generates an obligation to compensate. Both, A and B, are what I call obligations
C
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8of (distributive) justice whereas C and D are obligations of (distributive) beneficence.
C and D are moral requirements and should not be confused with the category of
supererogation. They are moral obligations, however, of a different level of
stringency. They are emerging in situations where the better-off have not contributed
to the worse-off’s dire straits at all. With obligations of beneficence the rationale has
to be of a different kind than in the case of obligations of justice – a rationale I do not
deal with in this essay.
The best way to further introduce this categorization is to state explicitly what
types of moral obligations my grid does not cover. As already mentioned it does
introduce negative obligations only indirectly. The negative obligation not to impose
an unjust global order will, however, play a crucial part in this essay. This has to be so
because the contents of A, i.e. the level of transfers required on grounds of justice
from the better-off, can only be determined when we get clear about what an “unjust”
global order is. Since I will define an unjust global order as one that powerful agents
impose on others and that makes the satisfaction of the latter’s basic needs
impossible, the corresponding positive obligation A will ask the better-off to transfer
basic material necessities in proportion to their responsibility for basic needs deficits
but not more.
This point leads to another category of obligations neglected in the coordinate
grid above. The four categories A, B, C, and D are all concerned with material
transfers from the better-off to the worse-off. As mentioned above the material
prerequisites, i.e. “basic necessities” such as financial and natural resources,
foodstuff, medical devices, etc., are a necessary but not a sufficient means to enable a
society to secure an environment that guarantees central capabilities. The non-
material prerequisites, i.e. a stable domestic political culture and institutional “basic
structure” committed to the goal of securing central capabilities for all citizens, must
be present as well. Material transfers alone will not do to compensate for the
imposition of an unjust global order. Support for domestic institutional reforms, local
democratic movements and even humanitarian intervention can have the status of an
obligation of justice if the better-off are responsible for the lack of democratic
institutions. Basic needs cosmopolitanism as presented here, with its emphasis on
obligations related to material transfers, is not a complete theory of global justice. In
addition, this focus does not imply that the obligations of justice related to the non-
material prerequisites of central capabilities are less stringent and urgent.
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material basic needs. The primary reason for putting to one side the better-off’s
obligation to take care about non-material political and institutional needs of the
global poor is that these obligations open up a whole new dimension of moral-
philosophical and political issues discussed under the heading of “global justice”.
Questions concerning support for domestic political reforms, ranging from the limits
of national sovereignty to the justification of humanitarian military intervention, are
very important. Since this essay is dedicated to global distributive justice, however, I
will dedicate the space I have on one out of the two, equally important, parts of “basic
needs cosmopolitanism”. Again, this does not imply that the second part of this
theory, concerned with non-material needs, is less important and the related
obligations are of equal stringency as the ones primarily discussed in this essay.
A, B, C, and D are positive obligations in Pogge’s sense. They ask the better-
off to arrange transfers of money, know-how, resources etc. to worse-off countries. In
the case of A and B these transfers are a matter of justice, in the case of C and D they
are a matter of beneficence. The crucial property distinguishing A and B from C and
D is that severe poverty and basic needs deficits (A) or global inequality (B) can be
traced back to other agents’ wrongdoing.4 The scope of this essay, with its emphasis
on category A, is a restricted one: neither does the argument for basic needs
cosmopolitanism give a rationale for obligations of beneficence at all, nor does it,
within the category of “obligations of justice”, debate justice-based obligations of
type B or the ones that are not concerned with material redistribution. Basic needs
cosmopolitanism is a combination of a reinterpreted version of Pogge’s definition of
an unjust global institutional order and the establishment of the resulting positive
obligations of type A. A requires the better-off to discharge this obligation in
proportion to their responsibility for basic needs deficits but not more. Since, on my
3 See footnote 47 and the discussion in the text on page 80 relating to footnote 86.
4 One clarification of the coordinate grid seems important: my categorisation might suggest that the
violation of the negative obligations of non-coercion and non-deception cannot generate the urgent
type of positive obligations of justice (type A). This is not the case: deceptive and coercive behaviour
can lead to someone falling below the level of her being able to meet her basic needs. In this case, the
resulting obligation to meet others’ needs for basic necessities is an obligation of justice of type A. On
the other hand, my category B wants to emphasise that coercion and deception do not, prima facie,
trigger obligations of the same urgency as the violation of the negative duty not to harm someone by
rendering meeting her basic needs impossible. Per definition, the violation of this latter negative duty
always generates category A obligations of justice. Category A cannot take place in case all people’s
basic needs are met! Category B can, however, emerge in a world in which all people’s basic needs are
met.
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definition, the global order counts as an unjust one to the extent to which it makes
meeting basic needs impossible or difficult for poor societies, the extent of what
positive obligation A can require the better-off to transfer must be determined by this
basic needs standard as well. This idea will be important to confront the
demandingness-objection against basic needs cosmopolitanism discussed in
concluding this essay.
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I. Global Obligations
In the political and everyday debate about global poverty one can observe a
competition of two enduring positions: on the one hand many citizens of well-off
countries will agree with a claim defended by philosophers such as Peter Singer5 and
Thomas Pogge6: It is admitted that we – by means of private financial transfers, our
democratic decisions and by putting pressure on our democratically legitimized
representatives – are by far not doing what would be sufficient in order to alleviate at
least the most severe instances of life-threatening poverty in distant countries. Even
the global better-off who regard the challenge of poverty as one that would ask them
for enormous sacrifices, if it were to be confronted successfully, have to admit in the
same breath that they do not even help as much with alleviating world poverty as is
possible without that constituting a weighty sacrifice for them.
Pogge points out, however, that it is a myth that the poverty related deaths of
18 million people annually are a political and economic challenge so overwhelming
that it could only be confronted by means of massive global redistribution and would
have an unbearable impact on the better-off societies’ ways of life and identities.7
According to Pogge “[t]he aggregate shortfall of all these people [the global poor]
from the $2 PPP [purchasing power parity] a day poverty line amounts to some $300
billion annually or just 1.2 percent of the aggregate annual gross national incomes of
the high-income economies.”8 The redistribution of these 1.2 percent would be a
sufficient means to lift the global poor above the poverty line and secure the
satisfaction of their most basic needs.9
On the other hand – and this is the second widespread position on global
poverty - even if Pogge’s statement is accepted many affluent societies’ citizens will
pose the following questions: “Why ought I to help these people? Why am I supposed
to have any stringent moral obligation to give away only the slightest part of my hard
earned income? Why should I consent to my government distributing (my) tax money
5 Singer 1977 [1972], pp. 22.
6 Pogge 2001, pp. 6-11 and pp. 98-101.
7 For a philosophical rationalization of this widespread assumption see Rorty 1996.
8 Pogge 2001, p. 7.
9 I am indebted to John Skorupski for pointing out that one has to be careful with Pogge’s claim
according to which defeating world poverty only requires such a small financial effort on parts of the
wealthy. There can be many distorting factors in non-ideal applications of Pogge’s idea reaching from
non-compliance to high transfer costs.
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to distant countries in order to alleviate suffering I am not responsible for at all?”
Whereas the first position focuses on the amount of help that would be necessary in
order to eradicate world poverty, the second one asks why the better-off have any
moral obligation to do something about world poverty in the first place.
We live quite comfortably with a synthesis of these two positions. We know,
on the one hand, that at least severe and life-threatening poverty would not have to be
accepted as an unalterable fact but could be alleviated significantly by transfers from
better to worse-off countries.10 On the other hand, we remain passive and we are not
embarrassed to justify our inactivity: it might be a good thing to donate some amount
to Oxfam or the International Red Cross – moral philosophers say a “supererogatory
act” – but the concept of “obligation” is said to be inapplicable in the context of
global poverty. In short: giving to the poor might be a morally good thing but not-
giving is not morally wrong.
In this essay’s first chapter I pay particular attention to the second, sceptical,
position on global justice. I will contrast the category of “supererogation” with a
“context-sensitive” conception of moral obligations concerned with doing something
about global poverty. Not being a matter of supererogation and alms, doing something
about the suffering of others abroad does at least have the status of an “obligation of
beneficence” (when we are not responsible for the global poor’s dire straits). All
major moral philosophical and religious doctrines defend the existence of such moral
obligations to help those who are in life-threatening dire straits. I will develop this
position in more detail with reference to Peter Singer’s consequentialist approach to
global obligations.11 Obligations of beneficence taken by themselves are therefore
enough to lift the requirement to do something about global poverty out of the sphere
of moral supererogation.
In addition, however, I will introduce the idea of “obligations of justice” to do
something about global poverty which becomes relevant when the better-off have
actually contributed to the dire straits they are asked to alleviate. In short, the
obligation to help the poor is a context sensitive one and cannot be categorised as
always being a matter of beneficence (or as always being, as the Kantian would say,
10 I am not talking about more ambitious aims here. It is true that a more egalitarian world-order or a
world-order based on fair equality of opportunity would make much larger redistribution necessary.
The prevention of poverty-related deaths, however, would be achievable without great sacrifices on
parts of the wealthy. That is what Pogge’s empirical and statistical picture suggests.
11 For another influential consequentialist account of global justice see Unger 1996.
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an “imperfect obligation”). Depending on the preceding wrongdoing that brought the
poor into their destitute situation, helping the poor can become a stringent
requirement of justice. Pogge’s empirical observations show that the obligation to
help the poor is indeed a matter of justice because it is the better-off who contribute in
large part to the global poor being in their needy situation.
Even though I disagree with the sceptic’s claim that giving to the poor is not
even a matter of obligations that are based on beneficence but merely a matter of
supererogation, I share her intuition that it must be of significant moral weight
whether the better-off share some responsibility for the global poverty they are asked
to eradicate or not. Singer’s consequentialism and O’Neill’s Kantianism fail on that
account. This chapter therefore addresses a number of fundamental moral-
philosophical issues related to world-poverty. Critical will be the questions of whether
there are positive moral obligations towards the poor and why and how obligations
based on justice differ from those moral requirements based on beneficence with
regards to their stringency and urgency. I will present three approaches to these
questions. My aim is to evaluate utilitarian consequentialism, Kantian theories, and
cosmopolitan contractualism and their different conceptions of global obligations
concerned with redistribution.
I.I. Consequentialists and Kantians on Global Obligations
Peter Singer’s 1972 “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”12 is one of the initial and
important contributions to the current moral-philosophical debates about global
poverty. In this essay Singer argues in favour of demanding obligations of the wealthy
to alleviate starvation in distant countries. Singer constructs his argument within a
consequentialist/utilitarian framework.
A consequentialist regards the current global situation as indefensible on
moral grounds because Wealthy states’ citizens and their governments could alleviate
a great amount of life-threatening suffering by transferring funds to the poor. A more
balanced global distribution of material resources would result in a greater overall
amount of happiness and well-being. This is so because the basic needs of the poor
could be met by requiring the wealthy to abstain from dedicating large parts of their
12 Singer 1977 [1972].
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income on goods and services that increase happiness only slightly. Lifting the
starving masses up to the level of secured basic needs is of greater weight in a global
utility calculation than the affluent citizens’ satisfaction of non-basic preferences. The
affluent’s sacrifices would not outweigh the suffering of the poor brought about if the
affluent refused to engage in the global redistribution of their wealth.13
Singer commences his argument by asserting two premises. The first premise
states “that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are
bad.”14 It is unproblematic to agree with Singer that this assumption is not a very
controversial one and I will therefore not try to justify it against sceptical extremism.
Things are different with Singer’s second premise: “[I]f it is in our power to prevent
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”15
It is important to note that Singer’s second premise comes in two versions: the
first one, stated above, is stronger than a second, weaker, version that replaces the
formulation “comparable moral importance” with the phrase “anything morally
significant.” Singer is confident that in the case of the current state of the world even
the weaker version will generate significant demands on the affluent. Once the two
premises are accepted it follows, so says Singer, that there is a strong obligation to do
whatever one can in order to alleviate global poverty and starvation. In order to
support his argument Singer introduces the drowning-child case. When I walk by a
shallow pond and see a child drowning I ought to pull the child out. I can prevent
something very bad (the child’s death) from happening at a very low cost (my clothes
getting muddy). The obligation to rescue the child is the result of accepting Singer’s
premises regardless of whether one adopts the strong or the weak version of Singer’s
second premise. My clothes getting muddy is not of any moral importance let alone of
comparable moral importance.
The strong version of the second premise leads to the requirement that the
wealthy give until they reach the point of marginal utility. The global better-off would
have to transfer large parts of their income until “by giving more, [they] would cause
13 Here I argue in accordance with Scheffler 1981. On the idea of giving “priority” to transfers
benefiting the worse-off recipients - “the principle of weighted beneficence” - see also Parfit, 1991.
“The principle holds that when promoting well-being, one should give (some) priority to promoting the
well-being of those who are worse off. Benefits to worse-off people matter more, they have greater
moral weight.” (Murphy 1999, p. 263)
14 Singer 1977 [1972], p. 24.
15 Ibid.
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as much suffering to [themselves] or [their] dependents as [they] would relieve by
[their] gift.”16 Even though Singer favours the strong version of his principle he
admits that there might be other consequentialist reasons for favouring the moderate
one. It might have fatal consequences on the globally aggregated well-being if the
developed countries followed the strong version and reduced themselves to the level
of marginal utility. An extreme slowing-down of economic growth in the developed
countries could lead to the overall outcome that these countries give less in absolute
terms. It must be noted, however, that these reasons for preferring the weak version of
Singer’s principle are themselves of a consequentialist nature. Just because it is my
family or myself who would suffer a loss due to the utilitarian redistribution I cannot
reject the strong version of the consequentialist principle.
Singer’s demanding conclusion is also the result of two prominent features of
consequentialism: 1. The second premise does not allow proximity or distance any
moral significance. From the moral perspective my obligation to help the drowning
child is equally strong as the obligation to help a starving stranger thousands of miles
away. 2. The premise is equally applicable in cases where I am the only potential
helper as in cases where I am among millions of people who could help. The
psychological effect of feeling less guilty when one can hide one’s failure to fulfil the
obligation to help in the mass of a modern state citizenry has no moral significance.17
The most important aspect with regard to our major question in this chapter on
global obligations is Singer’s claim that if his argument was accepted we would have
to redraw the distinction between duty and charity.18 Singer criticises the affluent’s
belief that giving money to famine-relief is regarded as an act of charity, i.e. doing so
is supposed to be a “supererogatory” act. While one is praiseworthy for giving away
parts of one’s income, the same person is not blameworthy for not doing so. Contrary
to this widespread opinion Singer’s argument regards someone who spends parts of
her income on fancy clothes (not on clothes essential for satisfying basic needs)
instead of giving these funds to famine relief as failing to live up to her duties. The
16 Singer 1977 [1972], p. 32.
17 Here Singer switches from the question of whether the number of potential helpers has any impact on
the stringency to fulfil the obligation to help the starving to the quite different question of whether the
fact that we are involved in bringing about the global situation has any effect on the demands of global
justice. Singer does not pursue this important point further. This question is of crucial importance for a
non-consequentialist justification of global obligations and for my differentiation between obligations
of justice and obligations of beneficence. See Singer 1977 [1972], p. 26.
18 I will use the concepts “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably.
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basic needs of famine victims are of high moral importance; the same cannot be said
of wealthy people’s desire to be well-dressed.
Typical for a consequentialist Singer does not pay attention to possible
differentiations within the group of moral obligations. In particular he does not
distinguish among different types of positive moral obligations – “positive” meaning
here “asking the obligation bearer to actively do something about the poor’s’ misery”.
From a consequentialist point of view the question of, whether and how the obligation
bearers – in this case the wealthy citizens of developed states - are connected to the
poor’s situation is not of moral significance. Important for Singer are the facts that
there is a large amount of suffering in the world, and that there is a straightforward
way to reduce the amount of suffering by means of assistance, aid, and redistribution.
It is a critical shortcoming of consequentialism that it does not differentiate
levels of moral stringency and urgency within the group of “positive obligations to do
something about world poverty”. Singer does not consider the questions of the
affluent’s responsibility and their involvement in bringing about the dire straits of
distant populations. In analogy to Singer’s drowning-child case this question focuses
on the fact that there must be a moral difference between being obliged to save the
child in the case where the child fell into the pond without one’s causal interference,
the case where one pushes the child into the pond unwittingly, or the case where one
pushes the child into the pond deliberately.
It appears indeed implausible to regard the first case as asking for a
supererogatory action. I agree with Singer that in all three cases we have some
positive moral obligation to save the child. It seems, however, to strengthen the
child’s case considerably when the obligation bearer is causally involved in bringing
about its life-threatening situation. It is this moral intuition, playing such a prominent
role in everyday and political debates about global poverty, that consequentialist
approaches such as Singer’s pay insufficient attention to. The (criticised) elements of
consequentialist approaches to global obligations we have to keep in mind are
therefore the following (here I already mention some concepts that will follow from
this criticism of Singer’s approach and will be spelled out below): The question of
whether and how the global poor came into the destitute situation that generates the
positive obligation to help them is not considered sufficiently in Singer’s argument. I
will introduce the distinction between obligations based on justice and obligations
based on beneficence to overcome this shortcoming.
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Singer’s approach to global justice allows categorising the better-off’s
obligation to help the poor as being a matter of beneficence only. Of course, Singer’s
positive obligation is stronger than “requirements” located within the sphere of
“supererogation” and it has been Singer’s lasting achievement to be one of the first
contemporary moral philosophers to argue in favour of global moral obligations
asking the better-off to transfer parts of their wealth to the global poor. I share,
however, Thomas Pogge’s concern that consequentialist and utilitarian approaches to
global justice leave a relevant moral intuition unaddressed, namely that a focus on
Singer’s positive global obligations to help, as he presents them, ignores the two
crucial issues of why the poor cannot satisfy their most essential needs and the impact
the answer to this question has on the stringency of the moral obligation to help
people with meeting those needs. Leaving the issue of the better-off’s responsibility
unaddressed has a detrimental impact on recognizing how stringent the moral
requirements actually are. Certainly, and Singer might stress this point in responding
to my criticism, not discharging his version of the obligation to help the poor (based
on beneficence as I stress) is morally wrong. Obligations of beneficence are moral
obligations and I take as their defining property that one is blameworthy if one does
not fulfil them. What I stress, however, is that within the context of justice, i.e. where
prior wrongdoing yields a situation that makes helping the needy necessary, the
stringency of the obligation to do something about world poverty is stronger than in
the context of beneficence. To ignore the context of justice is what I charge Singer’s
consequentialist approach to global obligations with.
I now turn to Onora O’Neill’s obligation-based theory of global justice.
O’Neill coins her approach a “maverick version of Kantian ethical reasoning.”19 She
takes Kant’s conceptions of perfect and imperfect obligations and the Categorical
Imperative in its universal law formula as fundamental elements of ethical reasoning
about world poverty.
For our current evaluation of how well various moral theories fare with regard
to grounding an obligation to do something about the distant poor’s dire straits, it is a
good staring point to take a closer look at the distinction between perfect and
imperfect obligations. Let us clarify the idea of perfect obligations first. A maxim -
defined by O’Neill as a “principle of action” and not as “acting on a certain
19 O’Neill 1986, p. 131.
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intention”20 - involving the use of coercion, deception or harm is not morally
permissible because its general acceptance would not be conceivable without
contradiction. We cannot conceive of a world in which all agents follow a maxim
based on, for example, deceptive behaviour. To render this idea more accessible
consider the example of an international business corporation negotiating a deal with
a Third World country’s government. Imagine the highly skilled professional business
executives deliberately keeping the harmful side-effects of setting up a factory in the
poor country, desperately in need of foreign investment, a secret. This pattern of
conduct constitutes an instance of deception.
Universalising this negotiating-strategy’s underlying maxim would lead to the
paradoxical situation that the corporation uses deception in order to achieve its goals
and at the same time all other moral agents use deception to achieve their goals. All
agents would then be in a world in which they both freely act and are unable to act
freely: “Any ‘consent’ or ‘agreement’ given to coercive [or deceptive, or harming]
action, which pre-empts the victims’ capacities to choose and act, is spurious. […] A
maxim of coercion [or deception, or harming] could not underlie all action, since
those whose agency is undercut cannot themselves coerce [or deceive, or harm].”21
O’Neill’s dense quote points towards the underlying philosophical idea of the Kantian
universalizability test. The crucial idea is that the business company acting on a
deceptive maxim would have to make an exemption from a general rule (“do not to
deceive”) for its particular strategy to work. Only in a world where it is only this
corporation deceiving other parties, would the cooperation’s dishonest strategy work.
If we try to imagine an alternative world where all agents make the principle of
deception their action-guiding maxim we simply fail to consistently complete this
imaginary task. If all parties were to deceive all others, how should the former be free
enough to do so when they are deceived and misguided themselves? This is what the
Kantian means with a universalised maxim being “not conceivable”. In addition, and
this is a slightly different point, to make an egoistic and non-universalizable
exemption in order to achieve one’s goals is not compatible with a central tenet of all
moral theories based on at least a rudimentary conception of egalitarian respect,
namely the idea of neutrality.
20 O’Neill 1986, p. 132. This is another move in O’Neill’s argument to show that the application of the
Categorical Imperative is not restricted to the acts of individual humans but can be extended to policies
and institutional behaviour as well.
21 O’Neill 1986, p. 139.
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Not to be allowed to make exemptions for oneself if this exemptions cannot
underlie all action counts for individual action as well as for institutional policies.
What follows from the non-universalizabilitiy of maxims based on coercion,
deception or harming is a perfect obligation not to perform acts/policies based on
these maxims. O’Neill identifies the group of perfect obligations by means of
detecting elements of coercion, deception, and the infliction of harm in fundamental
action-guiding principles someone is following. We are morally obligated not to act
on maxims involving coercion, deception or harm-infliction because universalising
them is not conceivable. An additional trait22 that distinguishes perfect from imperfect
obligations is that perfect obligations cannot be discharged in varying degrees. It is
not possible to non-coerce or non-deceive someone only a little bit. The prohibition
not to act on these maxims is absolute. Kant’s famous example, also pointing to the
problems generated by this categorical rigorism, is the perfect obligation not to lie
(even in the case a madman intent on murder asks you to tell him the whereabouts of
his would-be victim). The third property that is important for distinguishing perfect
and imperfect obligations is that only in the case of the former can the obligation
bearer be matched with a specific claimant (who is then the holder of a moral right, as
I will stress below). The obligations not to coerce, not to deceive and not to inflict
harm are “universal perfect obligation”; every moral agent owes them to all other
moral agents. The obligation to keep one’s promises (derivative from the obligation
not to deceive) is owed by the specific promising agent to (the) specific promisee(s)
and constitutes an instance of a “special perfect obligation”. Kantian “imperfect
obligations”, to which I will now turn, differ in all three respects from perfect
obligations.
More crucial for our endeavour of successfully confronting the sceptical
argument of our fellow Western citizen concerning a stringent obligation to help the
global poor is the Kantian justification of imperfect obligations. The group of
imperfect obligations comprises many duties. Here I concentrate on those imperfect
obligations that O’Neill presents as the ones requiring the avoidance of actions based
on maxims based on disrespect, nonbeneficence and nondevelopment.23 The most
22 I introduce three “properties” that distinguish perfect from imperfect obligations. The latter two are
spelled out in Pogge 1992.
23 Ibid., p. 136.
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prominent way to present these imperfect obligations as positive ones is to summarise
them as the group of “obligations to help others”.
In the case of imperfect duties we can ask again whether a particular maxim,
guiding the actions of individual or collective agents, can be universalized. The first
particular feature of imperfect obligations is that in their case the maxim’s attempted
universalization does not lead to a contradiction in conception (as is the case with the
rationale for perfect obligations) but to a “contradiction in willing.” A world
accepting the maxim that permits never to help the poor when this would collide with
one’s own minor preferences could indeed be conceived. Such a world is, however,
not a world we – actual earthlings - can rationally will.
At this point O’Neill’s stressed vulnerability of actual human beings plays a
prominent role. Since we are not fully rational and self-sufficient beings we know that
in order to achieve our short-range and comprehensive life-goals – something we will
- we need the assistance of other human beings. The contradiction in willing arises
when we consider that as physically limited human beings and wanting to achieve our
goals, we would accept the help of others but at the same time we would also assent
to a state of the world of universal indifference to the suffering of others because of
giving unrestricted priority to individual interests. Rationally and physically limited
human beings, dependent on the help of others to achieve their goals and to satisfy
their basic interests (which in turn is a necessary condition to develop moral agency
and to live an autonomous life) cannot will these two things together without
contradiction.
The nonuniversalizability of the maxim not to help others generates the
obligation to help some people at least sometimes. The duty to help allows fluid
degrees of discharging it but it nevertheless remains a moral obligation. This
argument leads to the point that the distinction between perfect and imperfect
obligations becomes less exact and more complicated on the less abstract level. Take
for example the perfect obligation of non-coercion. On the first sight this obligation
requires the obligation-bearer not to abuse her more powerful position to arrange the
terms of an agreement without taking into consideration the needs and interests of
other parties. When we construct this argument further, however, it becomes clear that
the lack of basic needs satisfaction contributes a lot to make moral agents vulnerable
to such coercion. This in turn suggests that in order to render agents less vulnerable
against coercion, positive action and the discharging of imperfect duties on parts of
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the obligation-holders is required. Discharging the perfect obligations of noncoercion
and nondeception can require a significant amount of positive action such as
redistribution and donations on parts of the wealthy, O’Neill claims.
After this very brief introduction of O’Neill’s Kantian categorisation of moral
obligations I now want to highlight a key question that seems to be left out of her
account and that leads us back to the problem introduced in my discussion of Singer’s
consequentialism. I have criticised Singer’s approach because it does not ask why the
global poor need help. Here my point is very similar and I apply a comparable line of
criticism to the Kantian categorisation of perfect and imperfect obligations. The
problem I have with O’Neill’s account is that she always categorises the obligation to
help the global poor within the group of imperfect obligations. If the current
unpleasant state of the world came into existence because of the better-off’s preceding
or current violation of a perfect obligation, then it seems problematic to categorise the
obligation to help as an “imperfect” one with all the properties characteristic for
imperfect obligations.
In order to spell out this criticism of O’Neill’s Kantian categorisation of the
obligation to help the global poor as always being an imperfect one we have to pay
attention to the three properties distinguishing perfect from imperfect obligations.
Firstly, the categorical imperative test works very differently in the two cases. In the
case of perfect obligations their universal violation is not conceivable; in the case of
imperfect obligations this universal disregard is conceivable but nothing we, actual
human beings, can rationally will. Secondly, in the case of perfect obligations every
obligations-bearer can be linked with (a) specific claimant(s). Note that this is not the
case in the paradigmatic “imperfect” case of the obligation to help the poor where it is
up to the obligation-bearer to decide whom to help. The case of global poverty seems
to be such a typical example; a Western citizen cannot help all the poor in Africa and
is, on the Kantian picture, free to decide whom to help. In addition, and this is the
third property distinguishing perfect from imperfect obligations, the obligation bearer
is free as to how much he should help the global poor. The last two properties point
towards the characteristic “latitude”24 going along with imperfect obligations and
within O’Neill’s picture the obligation to help the (global) poor is marked by this
flexibility in discharging it.
24 See Baron 1997, p. 16.
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I do not claim that the obligation to help the global poor can have the status of
a perfect obligation. What I claim is that it can have the stringency, i.e. the normative
force that gives us an especially strong reason to fulfil the obligation in question, that
is associated with perfect obligations. With regards to the second property, the
relationship between obligation-bearers and claimants, my point can be best
illustrated. When the better-off share some responsibility for the poor’s dire straits
then they owe assistance to exactly those people that are harmed by their conduct and
are not free to decide whom to direct their help to. In this context, which I want to
label the “context of justice” (as opposed to beneficence), it is the better-off’s
preceding actions that make the latitude, so characteristic for the typical Kantian
imperfect obligation to help, impermissible. Depending on the context of preceding
actions we can categorise the obligation to help the poor as a typical Kantian
imperfect one (context of beneficence) or a “more-than imperfect” one (context of
justice). In this essay’s second chapter I will show why this context-sensitivity of the
obligation to do something about global poverty also has an impact on the second
dimension of the latitude of the obligation to help the poor - the third distinguishing
property. I will claim that also the content and amount of the obligation to help the
global poor can be determined by adopting a specific definition of how the better-off
harm the global poor. What makes me reluctant to categorise the obligation in
question as a perfect one is the first property though, identifying perfect obligations
by means of the categorical imperative procedure. We can indeed conceive of a world
where the better-off do not help the global poor even in the case where they have
brought the poor’s dire straits about in the first place. The categorical imperative test
continues to work as it does in the case of typical imperfect obligations.
Thus, it is difficult to find a definite place for the obligation I am concerned
with on the spectrum of perfect and imperfect obligations. What I wish to stress in my
reflections on O’Neill is that there seems to be a tendency among Kantian approaches
to neglect the question so much insisted on in ordinary debates about global
redistribution. It makes a difference for the categorisation of the obligation to help the
poor when help is necessary because of other agents’ wrongdoing. I find it difficult to
regard this obligation as a typical imperfect one (properties two and three show why);
it is, however, also impossible to categorise this essay’s crucial type of moral
obligations as a perfect one (the first property shows why). I now turn to Thomas
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Pogge’s work which pays sufficient attention to the crucial question of the better-off’s
share of responsibility for world poverty.
I.II. Pogge On The Unjust Global Order And Negative Obligations
In discussing O’Neill’s obligation-based approach to global justice we have seen that
taking into consideration globally effectual social, political, and economic institutions
is of great importance for evaluating problems of global poverty. Thomas Pogge’s
approach to global justice focuses on the justification of those institutions. This
chapter presents Pogge’s most recent approach to the question of how to determine
the unjust condition of the current global economic and political institutional order.
Pogge’s works are marked by a theoretical development in three steps: The early
Pogge25 defends a variety of globalised Rawlsian contractualism. The moral status of
principles that guide institutional policies and actions are assessed by means of a
global Rawlsian original position incorporating the crucial element of a veil of
ignorance. In subsequent essays Pogge applies a Lockean approach to the crucial
question of whether the global institutional order counts as minimally just. Pogge’s
most recent publications, which I will focus on in my exposition, take the fulfilment
of basic human rights as the threshold of a just global order.
Pogge’s move from a very demanding theory of global justice (globalising
Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” – the difference principle inclusive) towards the
definition of an unjust global order in terms of human rights deficits is due to
rendering his approach to global justice as widely acceptable as possible to adherents
of diverse political and philosophical doctrines. Not only the Kantian contractualist
but also the Nozickian libertarian will regard the imposition of a global order that
renders the fulfilment of negative human rights impossible as being on a par with
violating stringent negative obligations and as constituting an injustice. Even though
this essay’s argument agrees with most of Pogge’s recent approach some difficulties
with it make an emphasis on “basic human needs”, instead of human rights, a more
suitable baseline for evaluating the current global order. Let me now turn to Pogge’s
most recent account of determining the global institutional order as “unjust”.26
25 See: Pogge 1988 and Pogge 1989, pp. 210.
26 Pogge 2002, pp. 1-26; Pogge 2005a; Pogge 2005b; Pogge 2005c.
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In a nutshell, Pogge’s strategy is to take the fulfilment of social and economic
human rights, as they are codified in the UDHR, as the minimal requirement for a just
global order. The global institutional order counts as unjust when it contributes to
making the fulfilment of human rights difficult or impossible in poor countries.
Better-off states and their citizens are harming the global poor by imposing such an
unjust global order. Pogge now believes that minimal social and economic human
rights are the most plausible candidate for finding an undisputed baseline for judging
the global order’s moral justifiability. This new emphasis on human rights does not
constitute a rejection of Pogge’s two older, and at least in the case of the first
(Rawlsian) one more ambitious, conceptions of global justice. Taking the supposedly
modest and widely shared standard of basic human rights as the baseline for
evaluating the global order is compatible with the more ambitious cosmopolitan
vision of globalising a Rawlsian conception of social and economic justice. Moreover,
Pogge’s recent approach is compatible with his Lockean state-of-nature-baseline of
global justice. Pogge’s recent, human-rights-based, approach describes a minimum
requirement of what fundamental property a not-unjust global order must possess. He
now believes that even the libertarian critic of global (and domestic) redistribution
will not find a global order acceptable that violates others’ basic rights and therefore
violates a negative obligation.
In what follows I present two criticisms of Pogge’s most recent approach –
one internal and one external. These criticisms allow me to accept most of Pogge’s
argument as a basis for establishing my own theory (basic needs cosmopolitanism)
with the important exception of replacing his emphasis on human rights with an
emphasis on basic human needs. In order to present these two criticisms I have to
discuss another aspect of Pogge’s most recent writings, namely his awareness of the
difficulties that emerge when the concepts “harm” and “justice” are related with each
other.27 Crucial for Pogge’s approach is, as will become more clearer below, that the
better-off states and their citizens are actively harming the poor, and therefore violate
a very stringent negative obligation. The Lockean approach to global justice links
“harm” and “justice” in a particular way. It presents an independently defined
conception of “harm” and then identifies the imposition of a global institutional order
as “unjust” when it harms the poor in this Lockean sense. Here justice is defined in
27 Pogge 2005a, pp. 4-5 and Pogge 2005c, pp. 45-46.
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terms of harm: According to the Lockean approach it is an instance of severe
deprivation when the poor are left with a share of natural resources smaller than the
equal share they are entitled to in a hypothetical state of nature. It is unjust to impose
such a harmful order on the poor and it constitutes the violation of a stringent negative
obligation to do so.
In the case of Pogge’s most recent version of his approach (and in the case of
his earliest, “globalising Rawls”) the relationship between “harm” and “justice” works
exactly the other way round, so Pogge claims. The “human rights based” strategy
works the following way: Identifying the global institutional order as unjust by
inspecting its impact on the fulfilment of basic social and economic human rights
does not conceive justice and injustice in terms of an independently specified notion of harm.
Rather, it relates the concepts of harm and justice in the opposite way, conceiving harm in
terms of an independently specified conception of social justice: we are harming the global
poor if and insofar as we collaborate in imposing an unjust global institutional order upon
them. And this institutional order is definitely unjust if and insofar as it foreseeably
perpetuates large-scale human rights deficits that would be reasonably avoidable through
feasible institutional modifications.28
My internal criticism of Pogge’s way of relating harm and justice in this way
concerns his idea that he can define a widely acceptable notion of global social justice
independently of any notion of harm. The passage quoted above introduces a two-step
argument: first comes a conception of social justice in terms of human rights and then
Pogge defines “harming the poor” in terms of this harm-independent conception of
social justice.29 My criticism is stimulated by Pogge’s motivation for introducing the,
seemingly, less disputed human-rights-based conception of social justice. It has been,
I claim, the fact that the Rawlsian conception of social justice is not explicitly enough
related to the notion of harm that renders it too ambitious to find the undivided
acceptance of diverse moral and political outlooks especially in the global case. The
human rights based variety of Pogge’s approach is indeed more capable of gaining
such acceptance. It does so, however, only by implicitly resting on a notion of harm
28 Pogge 2005 a, pp. 4-5.
29 His earliest approach, “globalising a Rawlsian conception of social justice”, has proceeded the same
way: in the first step the parties in the global original position choose a conception of global justice. In
the second step the existing global order is judged in terms of this conception.
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and by doing what Pogge tries to avoid, namely defining global social justice in terms
of harm.
The core of my internal criticism is that Pogge’s argument actually has to
introduce a third step in order to obtain the undivided acceptance it wants to achieve.
The third step spells out the reason why diverse moral and political theories assign
great moral importance to basic social and economic human rights. Why does Pogge’s
most recent proposal sound plausible, i.e. why does a global order “definitely” count
as unjust when it leaves basic human rights unfulfilled? The answer is, I claim, that
these human rights are themselves inherently related to the notion of harm. In fact
Pogge’s most recent argument runs as follows: the better-off harm the global poor by
imposing an unjust global order. This order is unjust insofar as it perpetuates human
rights deficits. Human rights deficits are regarded as being of highest and universal
moral concern because if these rights remain unfulfilled harm results. Therefore, the
specification of an unjust global order in terms of human rights is not independent of
the notion of harm. The unjust nature of the global order is identified by means of the
human rights deficits it generates; these deficits are, however, defining an institutional
order as an unjust one only because these deficits are tantamount with instances of
severe damage and, if this damage is due to other parties’ wrongdoing, harm.
In the case of Pogge’s earlier project, globalising Rawls, things are different.
In this case the conception of social justice (Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness”) is indeed
specified independently of a conception of harm. It is exactly my internal criticism’s
point that this harm-independence of Pogge’s early approach leads to it being too
ambitious to find undivided approval by adherents of diverse moral and political
outlooks. This is especially so in the case of discussing the issue of global justice.
Pogge takes the right step in deciding to focus on a less disputed definition of a just
institutional order. What Pogge does not notice is that approach’s better chances to
gain universal approval depend on the employed notion of human rights being
inherently related to the concept of harm. Actively contributing to the non-fulfilment
of human rights is in fact regarded by adherents of diverse moral and political
outlooks as a grave violation of a negative obligation and as constituting an injustice.
That better-off states and their citizens are responsible for human rights deficits in
poor countries is, however, regarded as “unjust”, by adherents of doctrines that are
sceptical of social justice, only insofar as these deficits are tantamount with severe
harm inflicted upon the poor. In a nutshell then my internal criticism of Pogge’s most
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recent method of identifying the current global institutional order as unjust is that
human rights can only function as an undisputed baseline insofar as we observe the
inherent connection between human rights and the concept of harm. The concept of
human rights carries with it the claim that very basic interests are at stake.30
That Pogge underestimates the difficulties that emerge with employing the
notion of human rights leads me to the second, external, criticism of his most recent
approach. Pogge takes the notion of “social and economic human rights” as an
unproblematic starting point for his argument. As quoted above he claims that an
“institutional order is definitely unjust if and insofar as it (…) perpetuates (…) human
rights deficits.”31 My internal criticism has shown that this “definite” connection
between injustice and human rights deficits only works when a narrow definition of
human rights in terms of severe damage and harm is employed. The external criticism
claims that there is a less problematic and more direct way to establish an undisputed
definition of the “unjust global order”, namely one in terms of “basic human needs”.
This essay’s second chapter is dedicated to presenting my argument that regards the
global poor’s basic needs deficits, insofar as they can be traced to the better-off’s
conduct, as the baseline for judging the global order as unjust. In accordance with the
basic needs literature32, I claim that the crucial property of basic needs is that harm
results when these needs go unmet. The advantage of this strategy over Pogge’s is that
basic needs are explicitly defined in terms of harm. I therefore prefer Pogge’s first
(Lockean) strategy and define global injustice in terms of harm and not, as his most
recent approach does, the other way round. I agree with Pogge that imposing an
unjust economic and political institutional order on the poor constitutes the violation
of the stringent negative obligation not to harm. The harm inflicted upon the poor is,
however, not that the poor’s human rights are unfulfilled but that the poor are not able
to meet their most basic needs.
Pogge admits that his recently established preference for using the vocabulary
of “human rights” is due to political reasons.33 Human rights are, so he believes, the
30 That I am not satisfied with this definition of human rights will become clearer below. In the global,
not the domestic, case I defend the argument that the poor only have a moral right to have their basic
needs met when the better-off have contributed to their dire straits. The purpose of my internal
criticism of Pogge is to show that even if libertarians agree with his human-rights-based argument, they
only do so insofar as human rights are concerned with very basic, harm-related, interests.
31 Ibid, p. 5. My emphasis.
32 For influential definition of “needs” in terms of harm see Frankfurt 1998 [1984] and Wiggins 1998
[1991].
33 Pogge at a conference in Edinburgh 5/2006.
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lingua franca in the debate about global justice and not much philosophical substance
hinges on using this notion. He even claims, and this point is important for the
remainder of this essay, that the notion of “human rights” can be easily replaced by
using the vocabulary of “basic needs” and “basic capabilities”. Pogge believes that his
argument works similarly in case one opts to use these notions in preference to his
conception of human rights.
I disagree with Pogge here. Since I do not think that the concept of “human
rights” is as undisputed as he thinks – consider the libertarian scepticism about social
and economic rights even in the domestic case – I prefer to take a specific conception
of “basic needs” with its inherent link to harm as the starting point of my theory of
global justice. In the next chapter I derive these basic needs from the capability
approach’s claim according to which there is a number of cross-culturally acceptable
“central human functional capabilities” that an institutional framework must allow
each individual participant to possess. Not possessing one or more of these central
capabilities constitutes a significant deprivation, I prefer to use the notion of “harm”
at this point – especially, and this will be the second crucial element of my basic
needs cosmopolitanism, when this deprivation is due to others’ wrongdoing.
In order to conclude this section I want to stress the importance of the
empirical data Pogge’s theory is closely related to. The importance of these empirical
aspects is one of the major features that distinguishes Pogge’s approach to global
justice from the other theoretical strands discussed above. Sure, also consequentialist
and Kantian theories of global obligations need to appeal to some empirical facts in
the process of confronting our sceptical affluent Western citizen’s arguments denying
the existence of a stringent obligation to arrange transfers to the global poor. Since
these approaches, however, take the status-quo as a sufficient basis for their
arguments it is enough for them to point at rather uncontroversial empirical
assumptions in order to argue in favour of an obligation to help the poor: The two
approaches mention the destitute situation of the global poor and the much better
situation of the affluent. On some occasions they point to the fact that it would only
be a minor sacrifice for the rich to alleviate at least the life-threatening cases of world
poverty.
Pogge agrees with these points but his theoretical approach, stressing the
better-off’s active contribution to world poverty, renders a much more complex
empirical story necessary. It is a strength of Pogge’s approach to global justice that it
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asks how the unpleasant status quo came about in the first place and why the situation
of the poor is enduring. Pogge admits that domestic causes play a role in the
explanation of underdevelopment. What Pogge rejects is a position he calls
“explanatory nationalism.”34 Local causes for poverty such as corruption,
mismanagement and civil wars are empirically easier to observe than the complex
global causes Pogge is primarily concerned with. Pogge’s project is largely dedicated
to face this challenge and to explain why the global causes are not only the more
significant ones but also how the local causes are themselves often the result of global
economics and politics.
We have seen that Pogge blames two major factors for the current situation:
the unjust global institutional political and economic order on the one hand and the
better-off’s individual involvement in upholding and legitimising these unjust and
harming institutions. Contrary to the other approaches, Pogge’s theory justifies our
obligation to help the poor with arguments that are more dependent on a causal,
political and historical analysis of the current world-order. Much hinges on
successfully showing that it is in fact the two factors that contribute to the severe
poverty characteristic of our world. I present two of the empirical observations Pogge
introduces in order to strengthen his argument.
Pogge’s empirical arguments pay much attention to the role of global
institutions and legal frameworks that regulate the political and economic interaction
among states, transnational corporations and other global moral agents. In analysing
the role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Pogge shows that
their influence on domestic social policies of developing countries is a major
contributor to inequality and poverty. Under the heading “Does our new global
economic order really not harm the poor?”35 Pogge discusses the effects the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO) policies have on the economies of developing countries.
He considers various baselines in comparison to which the effects of the new global
economic order should be judged. The question Pogge eventually addresses is
whether the global poor would now be better-off had the old global economic regime
continued to operate.36 Pogge regards this baseline as the most unproblematic one in
34 See ibid., pp. 110 and pp. 139.
35 Ibid., p. 15.
36 Pogge also considers a “subjunctive baseline” of zero global economic interaction. According to this
alternative the situation of the global poor under the new WTO framework must be compared to a
hypothetical state of nature in which individuals have an equal claim to a fair share of the natural
30
order to make his point. Defenders of the WTO claim that the new regime has in fact
decreased global poverty and the number of poverty related deaths to an extent that
would not have been possible had the Bretton Woods institutions remained
unchanged. An affluent and well-informed citizen may claim then that her
government has already done a lot in order to alleviate global poverty.
Even if it is true that the new WTO treaties have improved the situation of
some segments of the world’s poorest population, Pogge gives strong arguments that
this improvement is not at all a reason for affluent states (and their citizens) to lean
back and rest in inactivity. The crucial point is that even if the new WTO regime
harms the poor less then the old one, the new global economic regulations still unduly
harm a large number of the world’s population: “By analogous reasoning one could
argue that the headwind you are facing today must be benefiting you because it is not
as strong as yesterday’s headwind.”37 The new WTO framework does not cut the
affluent state’s tariffs and open their markets to the same extent as developing
countries are required to do:
Rich countries are particularly protectionist in many of the sectors where developing
countries’ are best able to compete, such as agriculture, textiles, and clothing. As a result […]
rich countries average tariffs on manufacturing imports from poor countries are four times
higher than those on imports from other rich countries.38
These protectionist policies have a significant impact on the economic options
developing countries are faced with. It is estimated that they could export around $
700 billions a year more were the developed countries to open their markets.
In addition, when it comes to negotiating the legal framework of WTO
policies many underdeveloped countries lack the expertise to successfully put forward
their positions. The wealthy states’ governments abuse this additional asymmetry in
order to maximize the negotiation’s output to their, and eventually their citizens’,
economic advantage. With regards to financial means and access to information most
resources. According to Pogge the fact that millions are not able to satisfy their most basic needs shows
that the new WTO regime cannot be justified when we take this Lockean baseline as the reference
point. Pogge focuses more on the practical baseline that evaluates the effects of the new WTO
framework in comparison to a world in which the old regime had prevailed. (Pogge 2002, p. 16)
37 Pogge 2002, p. 17.
38 The Economist quoted in Pogge 2002, p. 17.
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underdeveloped countries cannot compete with the bargaining power of the
negotiators representing the highly developed states.
Even if the new WTO regime has reduced the number of poverty related
deaths overall, it still inflicts severe and avoidable harm on the global poor, so Pogge
claims. This harm is avoidable because it is up to the big global players to change the
rules of the global economic order in a way that secures fair competition and open
markets. Pogge and other critics of the so-called “neo-liberal paradigm” are not
arguing in favour of isolationism (as did the “Dependencia” theorists in the 1970’s);
what Pogge claims is that the global economy must expose more free-trade and less
conservative protectionist policies than it currently does. The introduction of an
international economic order based on liberal principles – in the classical sense of the
word – would be a much less burdensome alternative for the developing countries
than the current one.
The second line of empirical argument in support of Pogge’s thesis that we
share a responsibility for global poverty and deprivation focuses on reasons for
underdevelopment that are ordinarily ascribed to local economic failures and
corrupted domestic policies. Civil wars, coups d’etats and severe domestic
inequalities are exclusively explained with reference to corrupt local elites and
democratic immaturity on parts of the local populations. In order to show that these
instances of “explanatory nationalism” are misguided Pogge discusses the
“international borrowing and resource privileges.”39
These two privileges are features of the international order that provide
incentives for authoritarian rulers to overthrow fragile democratic regimes in
developing countries. I cannot deal here with Pogge’s proposals of how these
privileges should be reformed so that they eventually even support democratic and
more egalitarian policies. What I want to do in the following is to show how these two
structural features of the global order contribute to local events that are often used to
show that it is exclusively the responsibility of underdeveloped states that they are not
able to leave a vicious circle of violence, war and severe poverty.
It is true that many of the world’s poorest countries are ruled by authoritarian
dictators and many of them came into power by means of overthrowing
democratically elected governments. Others stay in power by violently oppressing
39 Pogge 2002, pp. 146.
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democratic movements among their citizenry. A first thing Pogge draws our attention
to is the fact that these authoritarian regimes spend much more of the national income
on armed forces and weaponry (in most cases bought from willing Western
companies) than into satisfying the basic needs of the suppressed. This point leads to
the “international resource privilege”. It is often regarded as puzzling that many
resource rich developing countries are exhibiting such a significant degree of mass-
poverty. It is also regarded as a typical example of democratic immaturity that a small
corrupt elite is profiting from exporting these resources to affluent countries.
The current economic order is marked by assigning a legal privilege to dispose
over a country’s natural resources to whoever succeeds in conquering the power in
this state. Due to their dependence on natural resources rich country’s governments
and companies assign this privilege to democratic as well as authoritarian rulers alike.
To gain this privilege is therefore a strong incentive for corrupt elements in a
fledgling and fragile democracy to seize power by whatever means.
A related problem is caused by the so-called international borrowing privilege.
It is too lucrative to potential authoritarian predators to obtain the internationally
recognized status of being a state’s official government since this status brings with it
the permission to borrow large sums from foreign banks and to receive official
development assistance. It is the responsibility of the powerful global actors to change
the related legal norms in a way that makes the assignment of the two privileges
conditional on good governance, respect for human rights and the basic needs of all
segments of the population.
In respect of these empirical observations Pogge’s conclusion claims two
things reemphasising his point about the better-off’s responsibilities outlined above:
1. Especially the dependence of rich societies on cheap natural resources often
sustains undemocratic regimes and poverty. National causes for underdevelopment
are ultimately caused by the global political and economic framework. 2. It is
basically us and the poor countries’ corrupt elites that profit from this unjust global
order. Pogge’s radical claim is that Western governments and their citizens share a
responsibility for humanitarian catastrophes that are often exclusively explained by
pointing at tribe-structures, nepotism and a culture of barbarian violence.40 There are
40 I am indebted to Tim Mulgan for pointing out that the question of whether the better-off have
benefited from the actions that harm the global poor or not is a morally relevant factor in determining
the stringency of the obligation to assist others. In the text I do not consider this interesting question. I
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many additional empirical and historical considerations Pogge discusses in his essays.
Here I wanted to present his most plausible explanations for global poverty that
involve responsibility on the better-off’s part.
Even Pogge’s most plausible empirical claims are contentious. His claims
about the global economic and political order’s unjust condition and the better-off’s
individual responsibility have been under attack by philosophers as well as by
economists.41 I put to one side the task of defending those empirical claims. The
remainder of this essay accepts, for the sake of argument, Pogge’s claims that the
current global political and economic institutional arrangements harm the poor and
that these arrangements could be re-structured by the better-off in order to alleviate
global poverty. The next chapter examines in more detail the impact these claims
have on the extent, content, and stringency of the better-off’s obligations to take care
of the basic needs of the global poor.
I.III. Conclusion: Perfect Obligations and More-Than-Imperfect Obligations to
Help
We have now reached the endpoint of our examination of the most prominent
approaches of grounding and explaining the claim according to which affluent
citizens and their governments have an obligation not to remain inactive in the face of
the prevailing instances of severe poverty world-wide. In concluding this first chapter
am rather inclined to support a negative answer. Concerning the blameworthiness that results from not
compensating the victims of one’s wrongdoing I see no reason to differentiate between someone who
profits from the imposition of the global order and someone who is equally implicated in this
imposition but profits less. Profiting less from the imposition than others does not imply that this
person is less responsible for this imposition. The question of whether or not the better-off have
profited from their global wrongdoing might play, however, a role in determining practical realisations
of compensation. If the global order is imposed by the better-off but at the end of the day the better-off
and the global poor are both badly-off, the global poor’s (well-justified) claims to get compensated
might not be realisable.
41 One of the most explicit criticisms of Pogge’s empirical arguments was recently presented by
Mathias Risse in Risse 2005a, Risse 2005b, and Risse 2005c. His major claim in all three essays is: “I
seek to show that the global order not only does not harm the poor but can plausibly be credited with
the considerable improvements in human well-being that have been achieved over the last 200 years.
Much of what Pogge says about our duties towards developing countries is therefore false.” (Risse
2005a, p. 9) For a reply to the quoted paper see Pogge 2005a, pp. 55-59. In a nutshell Pogge’s reply is
that even if it were true that due to the new WTO regime less people die than if the old regime would
have prevailed that fact would not render the current order into an acceptable one because it still
foreseeably inflicts avoidable harm on a large portion of the world’s population. The discussion
focuses a) on whether this infliction is in fact as easily avoidable as Pogge claims it to be and b) on
whether it is the global order or local factors that are responsible for underdevelopment. Pogge and
Risse quote a large number of statistics to support their irreconcilable answers to these two questions.
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I want to present some thoughts that are supposed to introduce a synthesis of these
approaches. I try to extract the strongest arguments put forward so far and argue that
in the current state of the world our obligation to help the global poor is in fact more
than an obligation of beneficence. In fact, within a certain context of preceding
wrongdoing the obligation to do something about global poverty is a matter of justice-
based compensation and not of beneficence-based aid.
In short my point is that the categorisation of the obligation to do something
about global poverty is not fixed. My idea is a “context-sensitive” approach to the
categorization of moral obligations. The status of a specific moral obligation must not
be determined in isolation but is dependent on its position within the network of the
other obligations a moral agent is asked to discharge in a particular situation or was
asked to discharge in past situations related to the current situation. In addition, the
stringency of a particular obligation is conditional on the preceding acts that led to
bringing about the obligation in question by establishing a morally relevant
relationship between obligation-bearer and the party for which the obligation has to
be fulfilled. This is, I believe, the case when we are asked to discharge a supposedly
imperfect obligation and the situation that has led to the demand for discharging this
obligation has been brought about by someone’s violation of a perfect negative
obligation.
Let me try to make this account clearer by applying my account to our project
of confronting the sceptical argument of our fellow affluent citizen. Assuming the
adequacy of Pogge’s empirical story I agree with the claim that the global poor (the
helpees) are to a significant part in their dire straits because of the wealthy societies’
(the helpers) violation of stringent perfect negative obligations. This violation is in
most cases due to quite an indirect relationship and maybe this degree of indirectness
should be mirrored in the extent the wealthy have to give in order to compensate the
poor – I will consider this question at end of this essay. Nevertheless, in order to
challenge our fellow citizen’s popular belief it is enough to show that all of us and our
democratically legitimised politicians are responsible for harming people abroad.
Even on the strict O’Neillian reading of Kant this is the violation of a perfect
obligation. Both, obligation bearers and rights holders can be identified.
In case the global poor’s poverty is the result of this violation of the perfect
negative obligation not to harm (or other such obligations such as the ones not to
coerce or deceive) then and only then is the positive obligation to do something about
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global poverty more than an imperfect one. The severity of violating a perfect
obligation carries over on the related positive obligation to compensate for this
violation. O’Neill’s Kantian framework with its characteristic polarity of perfect and
imperfect obligations cannot assign a proper place for this specific obligation to
compensate the poor. It is located somewhere between these two poles. Moreover, my
approach avoids the problem with rights concerning the assignment of corresponding
obligation-holders, strongly insisted on by O’Neill: a right to get help can now be
assigned to the poor because when a perfect obligation (noncoercion, nondeception,
nonharming) is violated it is possible to identify the violator(s). These violators, in our
example the wealthy governments and their citizens, are then at the same time the
obligation-holders of the positive obligation to help. I therefore agree with Pogge’s
criticism of O’Neill’s argument according to which there can never be a right
corresponding to the imperfect and positive obligation to help.42 It is the
characteristic, two-sided “latitude” of the imperfect obligation to help others, i.e.
“whom one helps, how and how often”, that makes it, according to O’Neill,
impossible to clearly match obligation bearers and rights holders.43 Pogge is right
that, depending on how the poor’s need for help came about, it is possible to identify
obligation bearers and rights holders – this is the reason why I sometimes want to
label, depending on this causal context, the positive obligation to do something about
world poverty a “more-than-imperfect” obligation, a classificatory space missing in
Kantian categorisations of positive obligations.
The poor have legitimate claims against the wealthy, not because of the fact
that they are in dire straits – this fact by itself only allows them to appeal to imperfect
obligations of the wealthy.44 The poor have these rights-based claims because it is due
to the acts and policies of the wealthy that they are in need for help. It is therefore
crucial to consider how the unfortunate current state of the world came into existence.
My reading of consequentialist and Kantian theories suggested that these two theories
pay too little attention to this causal-historical factors of obligation-genesis.
When we are asked to help someone we normally take into consideration
whether we share some responsibility for getting this person into her needy situation
or not. Let me try to strengthen my argument by adapting Singer’s drowning child
42 Pogge 1992 and O’Neill 1986.
43 On this characteristic latitude of Kantian imperfect obligations see Baron 1997, p. 16.
44 The coordinate grid, presented in the introduction, identifies this obligation to help the poor in dire
straits as belonging to category C.
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example. Imagine you own a holiday bungalow next to a pond. In between the
bungalow and the pond is a narrow path. Since it is winter and snow fell and the path
is part of your property you are obligated to clean the path of the snow as all your
disciplined neighbours do. However, you are lazy, or you simply forget to clean the
pathway. A child passes by your bungalow, slips on the ice and falls into the pond.
You witness this accident and at the same moment another child is falling into the
pond just a few houses away from yours. I think, when you are fully aware that the
first child felt into the pond because of your carelessness, it will, all other things being
equal, be the first one you rescue. Your causal contribution to the first child’s falling
into the pond has some moral weight. It might sound harsh to a rights-theorist but
only the first child has a moral right (I am not talking about legal rights here) to be
saved. The second child’s falling into the pond only triggers a very strong obligation
of beneficence on my part but not an obligation of justice.
According to my contextualist approach to moral obligations it is therefore
incorrect to assign a global universal right to development assistance unconditionally
and a priori (in the sense of “before any empirical evaluations”) as rights-theorists
claim.45 The condition that must be fulfilled in order to assign such a right is that
obligations of justice have been violated.46 We can now confront our wealthy Western
citizen’s sceptical objection: “The current global economic order violates the perfect
obligation not to harm by rendering the satisfaction of the global poor’s basic needs
difficult or impossible. You are upholding (by means of paying taxes and
democratically legitimizing your powerful government) and profiting from this
international order. Your moral obligation to help the victims of this order is therefore
not an obligation of beneficence or a purely imperfect duty that gives your donations
the status of aid and assistance. You cannot reject giving unless you are prepared to
violate a moral right of the poor. In addition, as long as the global order works as it
does, you have an obligation of justice to put pressure on your government to end the
collective imposition of an unjust global order.”
In the following sections I want to assume that we have successfully
completed our job of persuading our affluent fellow citizen to accept that she has a
45 Aiken 1977.
46 That a rationale for social and economic rights must be very different in the domestic case is shown
by Blake 2001 and Nagel 2005. It is important to keep in mind that my rather unorthodox account of
global social and economic human rights is compatible with more ambitious egalitarian policies in the
domestic case, assigning, for example, an unconditional right to have one’s most basic needs met to all
citizens. See also Anderson 1999.
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strong moral obligation to do something about global poverty. In addition she
understands that she has this obligation because she shares some responsibility for
bringing about the poor’s desperate situation. Does this acceptance on parts of the
wealthy, however, answer all the moral questions that arise in the context of global
justice? Rather not. This essay’s second part is dedicated to the question of what
exactly the better-off states and their citizens should do about global poverty. An
answer to this question is only possible when the standard for judging the global order
as an unjust one is spelled out more clearly. In adapting Pogge’s recent writings I
have been claiming that the global order counts as unjust when it harms the poor. This
is the case when the latter’s most basic human needs go unmet because of other’s
conduct. Depending on what counts as such “basic needs”, the global order will be
identified as a just or as an unjust one. A wide definition of basic needs will make it
more difficult for an institutional order not to count as unjust than does a very
rudimentary list of basic needs. The notion of “basic needs” must be spelled out more
fully – always with the attitude in mind of finding a list of basic needs that is as
comprehensive as possible but still of cross-cultural appeal. To be more precise, basic
needs will be derived from a particular version of the capability approach.
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II. Basic Needs Cosmopolitanism
In this chapter I want to answer the second part of this essay’s major question. Our
overall project is to develop a theoretical account of what citizens and governments of
better-off states and societies ought, morally speaking, to do about global inequality
and poverty. The first sub-question concerning the existence of global obligations was
answered affirmatively by evaluating Pogge’s analysis of the better-off’s contribution
to an unjust global economic framework. In the last section of chapter one I re-
interpreted Pogge’s recent ideas and replaced his emphasis on social and economic
human rights with the vocabulary of basic needs and capabilities. I adopted that
strategy because Pogge’s project of identifying a global economic and political order
as unjust on the least controversial premises can be better achieved by means of
employing the notion of “basic needs” and its inherent connection to the conception
of “harm”. An imposed global order counts as unjust, I claim, when it harms the poor,
and this is the case when the poor are not able to access the means necessary to meet
their most basic needs due to the better-off’s conduct and policies. The most
important conclusion I borrow from Pogge’s analysis is the moral-philosophical idea
that contributing to other people’s dire straits and basic needs shortcomings renders
the obligation to help them an extremely stringent one. In fact, it renders the better-
off’s obligation to help poor societies and assist their development into a form of
compensation for past and present injustices.
In what follows I will present my answer to the question of what exactly
better-off societies are required to do about global poverty and assume that Pogge’s
empirical examples are correct. I therefore assume that better-off and powerful
democracies and their citizens have been actually contributing to the phenomenon of
global poverty and inequality. The answer to the question of what better-off societies
are required to do about global poverty is the consequence of the method of
identifying the global order as an unjust one, presented in the last section of chapter
one. On grounds of justice the better-off are required to transfer compensation in
proportion to their responsibility for the poors’ basic needs shortfalls. If we accept my
reinterpretation of Pogge’s account, and the obligation to assist the poor is at least to
this extent justice-based, then the better-off must focus their assistance on securing the
material and non-material prerequisites for satisfying basic needs and, consequently,
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basic capabilities. It is this obligation of justice, being of highest urgency and
strongest stringency, I am concerned with in this essay. My focus lies on distributive
obligations that result from the better-off’s imposition of a global economic and
political order that renders the satisfaction of basic needs difficult or impossible.
I address these issues and introduce Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach
in order to flesh out my account of basic needs. At the end of the previous chapter I
simply followed the common idea among basic-needs theoreticians and stated that the
identifying feature of basic needs is that harm results if they go unmet. I commence
the introduction of my basic needs cosmopolitanism with a discussion of Nussbaum’s
substantial list of ten central human functional capabilities and her defence of the
list’s universal and global appeal. I then apply Nussbaum’s theory to the issue central
to this dissertation, neglected by her though, namely the definition of an unjust global
order in terms of these capabilities. In the final step of my argument I derive the
contents of global obligations of distributive justice from them. Basic needs remain
connected to the notion of harm; in my picture they are so connected, however, via
Nussbaum’s central human functional capabilities. Basic needs are then defined as the
need for the material and non-material prerequisites necessary to possess the most
elementary items of Nussbaum’s list of capabilities. Not possessing these capabilities
constitutes harm, and being responsible for an unjust global order, which renders
access to their material and immaterial prerequisites impossible, triggers demands of
compensating transfers on grounds of justice.
II.I. Basic Needs as the Need for the Prerequisites for Central Capabilities
When we answer the question of what the better-off and their governments should do
about global poverty we can roughly distinguish two groups of responses: firstly the
global economic and political order has to be changed in a way that allows the poorest
countries to participate in the global system in a way that enables them to meet their
basic needs. The paradigmatic example of this strategy of development is manifested
in the developing countries’ claim that protectionism, for example, in the agrarian
sector on the part of the better-off states is the biggest obstacle in leaving their state of
poverty behind.
The second group of responses focuses on the strategy of redistributing
resources and basic necessities from better-off to poor countries. “Basic necessities”
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are defined here, as the material means necessary to raise the standard of living of
human beings to the level where they are able to meet their basic needs. It is claimed
that this redistribution of basic necessities is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition in successfully supporting developing countries in reaching a condition
enabling them to meet their basic needs. In addition, being able to meet basic needs
and, consequently, possessing central capabilities is itself a precondition to participate
in global economic and political processes more successfully and in a less vulnerable
way than is currently the case. Since the topic of this essay is global distributive
justice my concern in the following sections is primarily with the first of the, equally
stringent and important, two subgroups of basic needs, namely the one concerned
with the material preconditions for possessing central capabilities.47 Determining
what counts as basic needs therefore crucially depends on what counts as central and
basic capabilities. Only when we are able to identify some human “capabilities” – to
clarify this notion will be another centre-piece of the following discussion – as
“basic” ones we can in turn declare secured access to the related material and non-
material preconditions for possessing these capabilities as an urgent and basic need. In
what follows I will present this account of basic needs.
Concerning both groups of answers, but especially the second one concerned
with redistribution, successfully discharging the obligation to help the poor is often
regarded as being conditional on formulating specific goals of development assistance
47 I hope to make clear that a focus on the material, distributable preconditions of capabilities must not
be taken as presenting a complete picture of all the preconditions necessary for possessing these
capabilities. That is the reason why I distinguish two subgroups of basic needs, one for the material, the
other for the non-material prerequisites for possessing central capabilities. The first subgroup
comprises money, natural resources, medical devices, etc.. The second is concerned with the domestic
political and social situation of a society and comprises, above many other things, a minimally
egalitarian political and social regime that is committed to the goal of securing central capabilities for
all citizens. Having secured access to the objects of only one of the two subgroups of basic needs is not
sufficient to regard a society as being able to secure all its citizens’ basic needs. In particular, Pogge’s
discussion of the negative effects of the “international borrowing” and “resource privileges”, discussed
at the end of chapter one, shows that the better-off share a significant degree of responsibility for basic
needs shortfalls within the second subgroup. This responsibility generates obligations of justice to
support poor societies with establishing just domestic institutions. The availability of money, resources,
and other basic necessities are only one out of two groups of necessary prerequisites for a country and
its citizenry to possess central capabilities. Non-material preconditions such as stable and just domestic
institutions are the other prerequisites. My concern in this essay is with global distributive justice and I
therefore focus on the distributable material preconditions. The better-off’s obligation to support poor
countries in developing democratic and human-rights-respecting domestic institutions is not the issue I
am primarily dealing with here. This does not imply, however, that the better-off’s obligations of
justice to take care of the poor’s basic needs for the non-material prerequisites for central capabilities
are less stringent or less urgent than the obligations concerned with material transfers. I admit that
basic needs cosmopolitanism must actually consist of two parts, and only the first, concerned with
global material redistribution is spelled out fully here.
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in the first place. In other words what we need, in order to answer the question of
what exactly we shall do about global poverty, are certain results that we aim at in
deciding what actions we and our governments have to take and what local policies
and institutions should be the primary recipients of transfers and assistance. It has
been a long-lasting idea that development can be achieved by lifting a society’s GNP
above a certain level. Another variety of this “end-state” approach to global
development has been one more sensitive to distributive concern, namely social
primary goods approaches.
In what follows I will express my sympathy with Nussbaum’s (and Sen’s)
criticism of developmental approaches focusing on attaining a specific and inflexibly
formulated “state of affairs”. It is certainly true that my application of Nussbaum’s
capability metric to the question of global redistribution must aim at certain results,
namely that all human beings possess central capabilities and have the related basic
needs met. My approach does not, however, aim at one specific state of the world and
does not exclude various realisations of the aforementioned goal. In addition, it is
important to note that my presentation of basic needs cosmopolitanism is an exercise
within “ideal theory”. The desired result, following from applying the capability
approach to the issue of global justice, might remain a “utopia” in the sense that it will
not be fully realised in the real world. I agree with Rawls’s remarks on a “realistic
utopia” here.48 A theory of global justice is “realistically utopian when it extends what
are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility and, in so
doing, reconciles us to our political and social condition.”49 Basic needs
cosmopolitanism can serve as a regulative ideal, providing ambitious but nevertheless
realistic goals consisting primarily of a global order that no longer renders the access
to the material preconditions of central human capabilities for all impossible.
The idea to aim at a specific state of affairs is also undermined by basic needs
cosmopolitanism (at least with regards to the justice-based variety of global
obligations) for another reason. The central element of “basic needs obligations of
distributive justice” is that the better-off are required on grounds of justice to transfer
basic necessities in proportion to their responsibility for imposing an unjust global
order on the poor. A global order counts as unjust, in turn, when it makes the
satisfaction of basic needs difficult or impossible. This definition of an unjust global
48 Rawls 1999, pp. 11-23.
49 Ibid., p. 11.
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order renders plausible the resulting claim according to which the better-off do not
have much of a justification in deciding for what purposes their transfers must be used
by the receiving societies and/or their governments (this is very different in the case
of the basic needs obligation based on beneficence).
This unconditional nature of the justice-based transfers points towards the
incompleteness of basic needs cosmopolitanism: transferring compensation to poor
countries in the form of basic necessities is not only a merely necessary (but
insufficient) condition for the poor country’s citizens being able to possess central
capabilities; depending on the domestic political and social condition of the country to
whom transfers are owed, transferring this compensation might even do more harm
than good with regard to these capabilities. (In chapter one Pogge’s “resource and
borrowing privileges” were introduced in order to show that even with regards to
apparently domestic causes for basic needs shortfalls such as corruption and local
mismanagement responsibility on parts of the better-off is present.) The obligations to
help poor countries with developing just domestic institutions that distribute the
better-off’s transfers in a way that all citizens’ basic needs are met are, however, not
my major concern here – these issues range from support for democratic movements
to the disputed question of humanitarian intervention. It is important to keep in mind
that this essay’s subject is only a partial theory of global justice and it is primarily
concerned with its aspects that generate demands on the better-off to redistribute basic
material necessities.
Before we can address the question of how the better-off must discharge their
justice-based distributive obligations by means of transfers of basic necessities we
have to dedicate some space to examining Nussbaum’s capability approach. This is
not only necessary to determine what the better-off have to do about global poverty,
but is necessary to flesh-out the idea presented at the end of chapter one, namely that
a global order counts as unjust when it harms the poor which is the case when basic
needs go unmet due to other persons’ wrongdoing. Nussbaum has not intended her
approach to be directly applied to questions of global distributive justice. Nussbaum’s
version of the capability approach is more normative than Sen’s and she applies a
universal list of ten central human functional capabilities to the issue of what social
and political constitutional guarantees domestic governments must subscribe to.
Nussbaum does not consider Pogge’s and my point according to which better-off
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societies share some responsibility for domestic governments not being able to live up
to these constitutional guarantees.
This chapter is divided into two parts: I first present some internal criticisms
of Nussbaum’s capability approach. Even though I agree with Nussbaum’s criticisms
of utilitarian and primary goods approaches of comparing individual living standards I
present some critical remarks concerning the relationship between capabilities and
functionings and Nussbaum’s claim according to which a liberal society must not be
concerned with its citizens’ actually achieved functionings. After discussing
Nussbaum’s own approach and the claim that her capability list is of cross-cultural
appeal, I apply the capability approach to the issue of global distributive justice. The
capability approach can be used to compare individual living conditions; the lack of
some central capabilities can be regarded as instances of harm and as generating
urgent demands on domestic institutions. In conjunction with my overall idea (i.e.
why shared responsibility for a global order that makes possession of these
capabilities impossible generates obligations of justice) the capability approach can
also be used to formulate an answer to the better-off’s question of what they must do
about global poverty. At the end of this chapter I will introduce the notion of
“potential functionings” in order to show that developmental policies must adopt a
society-wide, instead of an individualist, point of view in order to determine whether
a society can really provide all the material resources necessary to secure capabilities
for all its members. If a global order renders potential functionings for all possible the
demands of global distributive justice would disappear.50
In a nutshell then, I will combine the capability approach with a
reinterpretation of Pogge’s recent account of global responsibilities. If an imposed
global economic and political order contributes to basic needs for the prerequisites of
central capabilities going unmet then the parties responsible for upholding this order
have an obligation of justice to stop imposing this order and an obligation of justice to
transfer basic necessities required to meet these needs. The justice-based elements of
basic needs cosmopolitanism concerned with global redistribution of basic necessities
are therefore relevant for a transition-period only. Once the better-off have stopped
imposing an unjust global order and the compensation for the previous imposition has
50 This only counts for obligations of distributive justice related to basic needs. Other obligations of
justice, also asking for global transfers in form of compensation, are possible above the level of secured
potential functionings for all. Coercive and deceptive behaviour on the global level generates the
second group of obligations of justice. See my coordinate grid of global distributive obligations.
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been transferred, only the negative obligation not to impose an unjust global order in
the future remains. Positive action in form of transfers to meet the global poor’s basic
needs is then a matter of beneficence and no longer of justice.
II.II. Nussbaum’s Conception of Central Human Functional Capabilities
Whereas it had been Amartya Sen who introduced the capability approach to
economic analysis it is Martha Nussbaum who, in recent years, has been contributing
the most to the theoretical development of this position. In addition, Nussbaum has
dedicated a lot of effort to empirical applications of the capability approach. In the
course of a number of field studies she investigated the situation of women in India
within the framework of her capability approach. It is also Nussbaum’s impressive
account of individual fates that highlights the advantages of an analysis of poverty
and deprivation that focuses on what individual human beings are capable of doing
and being over alternative approaches comparing individual living standards in terms
of utility or social primary goods.
Let us begin by briefly introducing the capability approach’s central
conceptions “capability” and “functionings”. Since this clarification is an aspect of
the capability approach where Nussbaum strongly agrees with and heavily draws on
Sen’s influential account, the following exposition refers to Sen’s writings.51 What
capability theorists initially proposed to present is a social-scientific metric for living
standard assessments and comparisons that is located on the subjective-objective
spectrum – on the subjective end utilitarian theories and on the objective end primary
goods and resource metrics - in a well-balanced way. Since our major project is to
answer the question of how policy-making agents and institutions ought to assess the
global order’s impact on individual levels of well-being and take these assessments as
the basis of society- and world-wide redistributive action, we cannot take the extreme
varieties of utility approaches as our starting point. These approaches are too
subjective, and once redistribution comes into play, requiring others to transfer means
to people cultivating expensive tastes to lift them to an equal level of well-being is
hardly justifiable – on the domestic as well as the global level. Similarly, that
51 Both, Sen and Nussbaum, have presented their capability approaches in a large number of
publications. The following exposition makes references primarily to Sen 1982 [1980]; Sen 1987; Sen
1993; Nussbaum 1993; Nussbaum 1998 [1990]; Nussbaum 2000.
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supposedly many of the poor in African countries are regarding the prevailing high
levels of infant mortality as a “normal” part of their living conditions is not a
justification for inactivity on part of the better-off societies. The other extreme
position, an objective list of social primary goods, is too inflexible a solution for our
problem of finding a suitable way of comparing living standards. As Cohen
summarizes with sympathising reference to Sen: “…differently constructed and
situated people require different amounts of primary goods to satisfy the same needs,
so that ‘judging advantage in terms of primary goods leads to a partially blind
morality.’”52
Sen claims that examining an individual’s “capability set” is the most
adequate way to compare living standards. The central concepts of “capability” and
“functionings” are supposed to provide the theoretical foundation of welfare-
comparisons that are sensitive enough to differences among individuals on the one
hand and objective enough to justify redistributive policies and evaluate the moral
justifiability of global political and social arrangements on the other – the second
claim not explicitly stated by Sen and pointing towards my expansion of the
capability approach to issues of global justice. Let us have a closer look at these
concepts.
Human functionings are a) actual doings and actions a person is performing
and b) actual states a person is in at the point of time of evaluating her condition and
situation of living. Differentiating between these two groups will not always be an
easy task as some of the following examples show. Functionings of the first group
consist of things such as working, attending educational institutions, moving freely
from location A to location B, practicing one’s religion, etc.. The second group of
functionings can, to put it a little bit cumbersomely, be summarised under the heading
“valuable states of being a person is in” and comprises things such as, being well-
nourished, being in a stable mental condition as well as being adequately clothed,
sheltered, and educated.
Whereas a person’s actual living conditions, what people actually do and are,
are this person’s functionings, the same person’s ability to achieve various possible
combinations of functionings is her “capabilities” or “capability set”. Remaining in
52 Cohen 1993, p. 16.
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the framework of an example by Adam Smith53 we can formulate Sen’s critical
distinction between functionings and capabilities the following way: actually
appearing in public without shame is functioning properly (relative to the social and
cultural standards of one’s society). Having the ability to do so, which does not imply
that one actually does dress oneself properly and appears in public in a way that the
co-citizens do not find shameful, and having the freedom to choose between the two
options of doing so and not doing so means that one has the capability to appear in
public without shame.
One might object here, that the example of being adequately dressed, relative
to a society’s standards, is a particularly bad example with regard to this chapter’s
overall goal of establishing a category of universal capabilities (and derived from
them, universal basic human needs) that provide a cross-culturally accessible standard
for assessing the harmful effects of the current global institutional order on poor
countries and their citizens. We can, however, easily apply Sen’s conception to a
much lesser disputed combination of functionings and capabilities. The difference
between being well-nourished and having the capability to be well-nourished can also
be illustrated by means of a helpful example. The example draws a distinction
between a person starving because of a famine in Ethiopia and a religious believer,
who abstains from being well-nourished over a certain amount of time because of his
religious conviction and the related prescription to fast. What both have in common is
that they have not achieved the actual functioning of being well-nourished and both
are, presumably, suffering the same physical experience of hunger. From the
perspective of some utilitarian approaches, the living standard of both would therefore
have to be regarded as equally bad. Sen’s approach, however, allows us to argue that
the religious believer does in fact have a higher standard of living, at least with
regards to her nutritional condition. The latter has the capability to achieve the state of
being well-nourished, whereas the starving Ethiopian does not only lack the
functioning but also the capability to do so.
With regard to many other essential capabilities and functionings Sen
confronts the challenge of cultural relativism by stressing that the “commodity-
requirements” for achieving these functionings may vary with social customs and
cultural norms. The crucial point for Sen’s overall approach is that the cross-cultural
53 Sen 1987, p. 17.
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importance of the particular functionings themselves is culturally and historically
invariant. Also with regard to Adam Smith’s example of “being able to be adequately
dressed so that one can appear in public without shame” Sen makes this point.
Whereas different cultures and natural factors result in locally diverse requirements of
what counts as being adequately dressed, the capability of “being able to dress in
accordance with one’s society’s standards of adequacy” is a cross-culturally
significant one. The gist of all this is Sen’s claim that it is not only the income or
objectively determinable amount of goods a person possesses that tells us what the
standard of living of that person is; it is “the type of life one succeeds in living with
the help of food and other commodities (…).”54
Nussbaum’s capability approach differs in two important respects from Sen’s,
and this will be the focus of this section. Firstly, she introduces a list of ten “central
human functional capabilities”. This list is supposed to give an account of the
capabilities and functionings that have to be present in every normal human life
regardless of cultural background and subjective preferences. Nussbaum explicitly
defends a variety of modest universalism and claims that her list is formulated in such
a way that it is neither too parochial to achieve undivided global approval nor too
general to be useless in practical processes of poverty-assessment. Secondly,
Nussbaum’s justification of her capability approach is philosophically deeper and
more foundational than Sen’s. This makes Nussbaum’s approach more interesting for
this essay’s exercise in normative arguing but at the same time the danger of
contested metaphysical and anthropological assumptions entering the picture
increases.
Nussbaum has always been sensitive to these worries. Her noticeable shift
from basing the justification of her list on an explicitly neo-Aristotelian conception of
human flourishing towards a political conception of central human functional
capabilities that provides the focus of a Rawlsian-style overlapping consensus bears
witness to this sensitivity. As we will see below this move towards a more political
interpretation of capabilities and functionings led Nussbaum to the confession that the
capability approach has much more in common with Rawls’s focus on social primary
goods than initial formulations of the capability approach had admitted. I will express
my agreement with this harmonisation and stress its importance for establishing the
54 Ibid., p. 16.
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elements of universalism in basic needs cosmopolitanism and the identification of the
requirements of global distributive justice.
In recent works Nussbaum initiates her justification of universal central
human functional capabilities with an “intuitive conception of truly human
functioning”55. The fact that her list can also be justified in an ancillary way by
providing the focus of an overlapping consensus is of more political and practical
significance than the justificatory power of the intuitive ideas themselves. Similar to
the later Rawls and his concern for liberal neutrality, Nussbaum now defends her
intuitive account of essential factors of a truly human life in terms of basic
requirements that have to be present in each individual’s human life as general
prerequisites regardless of what the particular life-plan of that individual is.
Nussbaum’s intuitive argument for the universality of her list consists of two claims:
first, that certain functions are particularly central in human life, in the sense that their
presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence of human
life; and second – this is what Marx found in Aristotle – that there is something that it is to do
these functions in a truly human way, not a merely animal way.56
As we will see in discussing Nussbaum’s list, it is practical reason and social
affiliation that are regarded as the two most central capabilities (I will argue that these
two doings and states are better formulated in terms of actually achieved functionings
than capabilities when it comes to establish them as standards of distributive justice).
This point is especially relevant for Nussbaum’s Marxian refinement mentioned in the
quote above. When it comes to the predicate “truly human” it is not enough that a
human being just functions properly, e.g. is in a state of being well nourished. In order
for that functioning to be truly human it has to be “infused by practical reason and
sociability”, which are also introduced as the “two human powers”57. A person who
starves and merely “consumes” rudimentary nourishments in order to prevent her
death is functioning, so says Nussbaum in accordance with Marx, on the level of a
mere animal and is not a human being in the full sense.
The fundamental idea of Nussbaum’s justification of the universality of some
basic human functionings and capabilities is a picture of the human being as shaping
55 Nussbaum 2000, p. 76.
56 Ibid, pp. 71-72.
57 Ibid, p. 72.
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its life by means of practical reason within a social context of interpersonal
interaction. Nussbaum also uses the notion of “human freedom and dignity” in this
context to point towards a comprehensive but nevertheless culturally invariant
description of what minimal set of doings and states a human life has to exhibit. What
it comes down to is an emphasis on the fact that, regardless of what cultural
background we take as a starting point, human beings are recognised as individuals
with their own will. This is not intended to ignore the countless instances of social,
religious and political structures denying individuals the chance to live in accordance
with the two human powers; it is exactly Nussbaum’s intention to show that structures
denying a minimum of individual autonomy and sociability are unjust because they
deny their members access to central human functionings and capabilities.
Even though Nussbaum’s intuitive idea, as presented in her later works, still
resembles her earlier writings in which she heavily draws on Aristotle’s normative
anthropology, she is now much more concerned with the question of whether this
conception can be agreed upon by various cultures and traditions. Nussbaum’s
strategy to strengthen the intuitive power of her picture of the dignified human being
is unusual, at least from the perspective of the analytical philosopher. She makes
references to literature, in particular myths and stories, from all over the world. When
we get to know these tales about individual human fortune and tragedy we react in
similar ways, independently of the cultural particulars that are present in these stories.
There are universal patterns of life and universal elements of the human condition
depicted in these works of art. The similar reception of these works by people across
the world leads Nussbaum to the conclusion that the idea of human worth, dignity and
agency has broad cross-cultural resonance and intuitive power.
Regardless of what religious or metaphysical assumptions people take as a
starting point for reflecting upon the question of what makes a life truly human,
Nussbaum claims, they will regard certain deprivations as curtailing the process of
human lives. Her political conception of human capabilities (and functionings) is
supposed to provide a list of aspects of human lives that are regarded as crucial
without presupposing a particular religious or philosophical outlook. This is the point
where Rawls’s political liberalism becomes relevant, and Nussbaum wants her list to
be understood as a “freestanding conception” for political purposes that does not
make reference to any contested metaphysical assumptions. Whereas Rawls takes the
constitutional tradition and history of democratic societies as support for his political
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conception of free and equal persons, Nussbaum makes references to the global
history of literature. The underlying political rationale is the same, namely to create
the basis for an “overlapping consensus”, in Nussbaum’s case, on a list of basic
capabilities and functionings that are supposed to be the foundation of legitimate
claims of individuals against their governments or, as I want to add, of a minimally
just global economic and political order.58 Nussbaum claims that not reaching a
minimum level in one or more of the spheres of the central human functional
capabilities should be regarded as generating moral, and constitutional, obligations
that the individuals in question are lifted above this minimum.
At this point Nussbaum’s argument proceeds rather hastily. She is, I think,
accurate in arguing for the universal appeal of her picture of the human being and its
most fundamental needs. Her excursus into common human experiences and the way
these experiences are depicted in the works of world literature, make it plausible to
enumerate a number of fundamental and indispensable elements of every human life.
It is also quite undeniable that the lack of one or more of these elements constitutes
instances of severe damage and deprivations. The next step in Nussbaum’s argument
is, however, made too quickly. She claims that the universal sympathising responses
to characters in works of literature who, for example, are beaten down by the currents
of chance and lack access to basic necessities “provide us with strong incentives for
protecting that in persons that fills us with awe [i.e. the aspects of a human being
indicating that she has her own will and actively shapes her life as an autonomous
being].”59
In accordance with what I said in this essay’s first chapter I think we have to
be careful here, especially when Nussbaum’s account is applied to the issue of global
redistribution. Nussbaum seems to derive claims and corresponding obligations of
distributive justice directly from her conception of universal central human functional
capabilities. Our being impressed by how different human beings are from mere
animals and our cognition of the specifically human functionings and capabilities
taken by themselves, however, do not generate obligations of justice to protect these
features of human lives. That does not imply, especially on my account of moral
58 At this point it is important to stress that Nussbaum’s project is to use the list of “central human
functional capabilities” as a means to justify constitutional principles and guarantees within the
traditional nation state. I will discuss Nussbaum’s emphasis on the nation state as the primary agent of
redistribution and primary guarantor of basic capabilities below.
59 Nussbaum 2000, p. 73.
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obligations, that there are no alternative kinds of moral obligation, like the ones based
on beneficence, asking us to help others with achieving a threshold level of basic
functionings and capabilities. I have been arguing throughout this essay, however,
that there has to be shown that there is a special relationship and responsibility
between obligation bearer and claimant in order to let an obligation fall within the
category of justice. Nussbaum’s justification of the list of central human functional
capabilities will be helpful for basic needs cosmopolitanism. When we identify the
current global order as unjust and correspondingly the justice-based objectives of
development policies, Nussbaum’s capabilities list is the most plausible candidate.
But when we want to answer the question of why and under what circumstances this
list generates obligations of justice, Nussbaum’s capability approach by itself leaves
the critical questions unaddressed.
Nussbaum does not use my distinction between justice and beneficence. In
Women and Human Development she applies the capability approach to the question
of what social and political constitutional guarantees governments (of developed and
developing countries) have to subscribe to in order to lift all citizens above a
“threshold level of each capability beneath which it is held that truly human
functioning is not available to citizens”.60 I use her approach of justifying the
importance of these capabilities to show that profiting from and upholding an unjust
global order is the violation of a negative obligation: This order is unjust in so far as it
renders access to the material and/or non-material prerequisites for possessing these
capabilities difficult or impossible. Continuous imposition of such an order results in
obligations of justice to compensate and redistribute basic necessities in proportion to
being responsible for the inaccessibility of these basic necessities.
Nussbaum, however, does not give any such justification for her obligations of
distributive justice. She does not do so in the domestic, let alone the global case and
rather adopts a strategy popular amongst basic needs theoreticians61 – a strategy I
disagree with. Nussbaum seems to embrace the idea that unmet basic needs always
trigger society-wide justice-based obligations to meet them. I am myself convinced
that such a justification can be given for the domestic case, a justification I cannot
dedicate space to here. I also agree with Nagel and Blake that a justification for the
global case must be of a very different kind than for the domestic case – one
60 Ibid., p. 6.
61 See Brock 1998.
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justification for global justice-based redistribution is presented in this essay.
Nussbaum, however, fails to provide either of the two. With regard to the domestic
case she simply assumes that the great importance that is cross-culturally assigned to
her ten basic capabilities inherently carries with it the power to generate obligations of
distributive justice to provide for their general possession. States, so she claims, must
subscribe to and constitutionally guarantee the discharge of these obligations. I
believe that such a rationale for the domestic case can be given but I cannot dedicate
the space to justify it here. With regards to the global case Nussbaum simply does not
address the question. Since, according to Nussbaum, the major actor concerned with
distributive justice remains the traditional nation state it must be these states’
domestic constitutional and institutional arrangements that are responsible for
distributive justice and the provision of the prerequisites of central capabilities.62
Before I introduce her list of ten central human functional capabilities it is
therefore important to summarise where I agree with Nussbaum and where I disagree
with her or put a different emphasis than she does. The importance of Nussbaum’s
capability approach lies in her giving a convincing philosophical underpinning of the
claim according to which ten capabilities are indispensable features of every human
life. People all over the world and independent from sociological and cultural
differences regard these ten aspects as important to lead a truly human life. Nussbaum
derives from this point the conclusion that nation states’ domestic institutions must
constitutionally guarantee these central capabilities – a claim I agree with but I do not
see sufficiently argued for in Nussbaum’s writings. I transfer her story about the
cross-cultural importance of the ten capabilities onto the global level and derive from
62 In Women and Human Development Nussbaum explicitly notes that she neglects questions of global
distributive justice. There she writes: “The effective pursuit of many of the items on the list for many
nations requires international cooperation; it will also require some transfers of wealth from richer
nations to poorer nations. I have said nothing here about the justification for such transfers or the
mechanisms governing them, but such further arguments will prove important as we strive to make a
threshold level of capability available to all the world’s people.” But she concludes: “Nonetheless, even
a highly moralized globalism [a globalism respecting the central capabilities of all human beings that
sets limits to purely economic considerations of efficiency] needs nation states at its core, because
transnational structures (at least the ones we know about so far) are insufficiently accountable to
citizens and insufficiently representative of them. Thus the primary role for the capabilities account
remains that of providing political principles that can underlie national constitutions; and this means
that practical implementation must remain to a large extent the job of citizens in each nation.”
(Nussbaum 2000, pp. 104-105) My discussion of Nussbaum’s approach accepts her arguments
stressing the importance of her ten basic capabilities. Where I expand her approach is the issue of
global justice and the violation of negative obligations when the global order impairs the possession of
these capabilities in poor countries. Where I disagree with Nussbaum is the link between the
importance of capabilities for every human life and the obligation to take care of humans abroad (and
at home) so that they possess these capabilities.
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this story the claim that a global order that renders access to the material and non-
material prerequisites for these capabilities impossible harms the global poor and is
therefore unjust. Nussbaum does not ask the Poggean question of whether it is to
some extent the global order that can be blamed for the many instances of men and
women not possessing even the most basic of her ten central capabilities. In addition,
and this idea will be argued for in detail in the next section, imposing such an order
results in obligations of distributive justice to compensate – not simply because
people are not possessing basic capabilities (that fact, taken by itself, is only enough
for beneficence-based obligations to help the poor) but because others have
contributed to these dire straits. In a nutshell, I combine Pogge’s theory about the
global order’s violation of negative duties with Nussbaum’s capability approach.
Where Pogge regards the global order as unjust because it makes the fulfilment of
basic social and economic human rights impossible I say that the global order is
unjust because it impairs the possession of central capabilities for all.
We have clarified the justificatory foundations of Nussbaum’s capability
approach. It is now time to introduce and discuss her list of central human functional
capabilities that is supposed to find cross-cultural approval and can be used as a
standard to assess the harmful effects of globally pervasive economic and political
institutions and practices.
The list comprises ten capabilities:
1. Life: Here Nussbaum is concerned with the capability to live a life of
“normal” length. She does not specify the amount of years that has to be
regarded as constituting a normal span of life, but I think this is in fact a
secondary issue. It seems obvious, for example, that a person dying before
reaching sexual maturity and before being able to procreate and raise children
has not even reached a biologically minimal duration of life.63
63 My interpretation of this capability does not imply that public concern for a normal human lifespan
ends after one is not able to procreate any longer. It is simply a fact that it would be a non-
universalisable state of affairs if all members of a society died before being able to procreate. Apart
from this dissatisfying definition of a “normal” life expectancy I do not have a solution to the problem
of finding a globally applicable standard. The “multiple realizability” of the capability list’s members
would help Nussbaum in avoiding these troubles but not me. She claims that “the items on the list are
to some extent differently constructed by different societies. (…) (the list’s) members can be more
concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances.” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 77) This
multiple realizability would allow Nussbaum to give the notion “normal” in “a human life of normal
length” a flexible spin. Depending on a country’s economic and scientific potential the average life
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2. Bodily health: This capability comprises the functionings of having good
health, being adequately nourished and having adequate shelter. I interpret
Nussbaum as applying a broader definition of “good health” here, than just the
absence of life-threatening diseases. The capability to have good health, so
understood, consists also of the opportunity to live in accordance with a
healthy life style and consuming unpolluted nourishments – a capability many
people in developing countries lack.
3. Bodily integrity: Nussbaum’s emphasis here is the basic capability to have
“one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign” and to be secure against bodily
insult. As I will discuss after presenting the complete list these “capabilities”
are difficult to distinguish from the desirability of actually achieved
functionings. It seems odd to regard “security against bodily assault” as a mere
opportunity one has, instead of formulating political goals aiming at actually
securing each citizen’s bodily integrity, as far as possible in real-world
circumstances. Nussbaum’s second group of doings and states falling under
the heading of “bodily integrity”, sexual satisfaction and choice in matters of
reproduction, seems to be a more plausible candidate for genuine capabilities.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought: At this point Nussbaum’s Marxian
notion of functioning in a “truly human way” is of critical importance. She
claims that an adequate education has to secure quite a high level of using
ones senses and using ones capacity to reason. From this more general claim
Nussbaum derives a rationale for freedom of speech, freedom of expression,
and freedom of religion which are all necessary to render the capability to
think critically possible. One might worry at this point whether or not
Nussbaum introduces a too comprehensive, humanistic set of cultural and
artistic capabilities (including “musical and literary expression”), a set that
goes too far and cannot meet with cross-cultural approval concerning its
urgency and harm-relatedness. With regard to my current project of adopting
expectancy will be higher or lower and an individual’s age will count as “normal” with regards to the
country’s potential and not with regard to an objective global standard. Since Nussbaum is concerned
with principles of domestic justice securing a local threshold for a specific country’s citizens she might
argue that this threshold varies between societies. Whatever one thinks about this possibility I cannot
take that route because my application of the capability list to the issue of global justice only works
when an objective threshold is employed. In the case of life expectancies this means that a global order
is unjust when it can be blamed for a country having a lower average life-expectancy than the objective
one. What this objective life expectancy should be is of course the difficult question I am not able to
answer here.
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Nussbaum’s list as the crucial standard for assessing the just/unjust condition
of the global order, one might worry whether the crucial link between basic
capabilities/needs on the one hand and harm on the other can be upheld when
such “advanced” capabilities64 find their way on the list. Moreover, to what
extent Nussbaum’s insistence on the point according to which basic65
education is a necessary good in order to achieve a minimal level of
imagination and thought can be questioned. In order to apply this fourth
central human functional capability to my harm-based theory of global justice
I want to reformulate it in terms of basic education: a minimal level of society-
guaranteed school education for all is necessary within a globalised political
and economic system, making the need for a unified definition of what counts
as a sufficient level of education an urgent requirement in order to decide
whether the global order is only an imposed one, or one that is acceptable to
all participating in it and affected by it.
5. Emotions: Here Nussbaum puts special emphasis on creating and maintaining
social structures that enable individuals to cultivate their capabilities to have
attachments to things and people. Nussbaum’s qualification, according to
which these capabilities are best understood as making negative demands on
the state/society and compatriots is important. With regard to emotions it
seems crucial not to interfere with the course of normal human development
in a corrupting way. Nussbaum explicitly mentions the freedom from fear,
64 The same worry applies to other members on Nusssbaum’s list such as “other species” and “play”. I
will return to this discussion about what members on her capability list are related to “harm” below.
65 The case of “basic” education is to some extent comparable to the life-expectancy-problems above.
What counts as “adequately educated” is relative to a society’s own standards. On the other hand one
might argue that a very basic education is a universal and cross-culturally similar good. What really
distinguishes the case of basic education from the case of comparing life-expectancies, however, is the
following point concerning the harmful effects of lack of basic education on developing societies.
One strategy to determine whether or not a level of basic education is met within the context
of the debate about global justice might be the following: part of the reason why the current global
order counts as unjust is that the persisting basic needs shortfalls of poor populations are due to the lack
of resources needed to provide basic schooling for its population. Education and schooling are
necessary conditions for rendering citizens and, derived from that, the society in question into
responsible and accountable actors on the global level. In addition, and here I come back to Onora
O’Neill’s account of why negative duties sometimes imply positive action, in order to render poor
societies less vulnerable to deception, coercion and the imposition of an unjust global order, citizens
and their governments must have access to information and certain intellectual resources and abilities.
Currently poor countries are caught in a vicious circle: the imposed global order is responsible for these
society’s not being able to provide basic education for all; because these society’s citizenry and their
representatives are insufficiently educated and lack access to critical intellectual and scientific
resources and knowledge it is easy to impose an unjust global order on them. (On this point see
Pogge’s quote in The Economist in Pogge 2002, p. 17)
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traumatic events of abuse and neglect, and involuntary isolation. With regard
to applying this capability to the project of using it as a standard for judging
whether the global order harms the poor we can say that this capability results
primarily in negative obligations of justice, i.e. in the obligation to stop
imposing a global order that impairs the normal emotional development of
human beings. Concerning this capability it is difficult to determine what
material prerequisites are required to secure its possession. As a consequence
of these difficulties I prefer to interpret and label Nussbaum’s capability of
emotions in a slightly different way. A focus on “mental health” seems to be
more tightly related to the concept of “harm” and therefore seems to fit better
with the project of basic needs cosmopolitanism and my focus on basic
necessities: A global order that has negative effects on the poor societies’
social environment with regard to basic mental health counts as unjust. I take
it that a concern with basic mental health is more practical and less demanding
than Nussbaum’s quite advanced conception of “emotional capabilities”. I also
think that with regard to mental health a political concern with actually
achieved functioning is a proper standard for evaluating the global order. This
is a core idea of my criticisms of Sen and Nussbaum according to which their
exclusive focus on capabilities and their failure to embrace some actually
achieved functionings as political goals (because a state’s concern for citizens’
functionings conflicts with their conceptions of “liberal neutrality”) is
misconceived. It seems implausible to me to regard the importance of mental
health only in the form of a mere capability and not as a functioning that has
to be guaranteed for all members of society. How shall people make use of
their other capabilities when they are not actually achieving a minimum level
of mental health? More on that below.
6. Practical Reason: With practical reason Nussbaum basically means what
Rawls defines as the second moral power of free and equal persons66, namely
the ability to form and critically revise a conception of the good life including
its specific normative standards. Especially with this “capability” my
aforementioned criticism of an exclusive focus on capabilities as legitimate
political goals applies. How shall people reflect upon the various options they
66 Rawls 1993, p. 19.
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have and how shall they decide whether or not to transfer a specific capability
into the corresponding actual functioning when they do not actually reason
practically? There is an additional argument for why the actual performance of
practical reasoning is of relevance for global justice.67 Since my differentiation
between obligations of justice and obligations of beneficence is critically
dependent on identifying the moral agents who are responsible for the global
poor’s plight I must pay particular attention to whether the poor actually
reason practically or not. Practical reasoning is a precondition for rational
agency and responsible action. Agents who are impaired in reasoning
practically cannot be held responsible for their current situation. If it is in fact
the case that the poor are not actually reasoning practically then the better-off
will always continue to be responsible for their miserable situation.
Nussbaum, who is not primarily concerned with the question of what global
factors contribute to the global poor’s capability deficits, does not have to pay
similar attention to this connection between actually functioning in accordance
with standards of practical reason on the one hand and responsibility on the
other.
7. Affiliation: A. The first part of this capability is concerned with engaging in
rational discourse with other human beings, in order to develop one’s rational
capacities and one’s critical potential. Political and social institutions as well
as freedom of assembly and political speech have to be established and
secured in order to provide the framework for this capability. B. Here
Nussbaum establishes a connection between the social bases of self-respect
and equality. Truly human affiliation is only possible when discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or
nationality is ruled out. The part of basic needs cosmopolitanism, presented in
this essay, with its focus on the material prerequisites for this capability will
not be primarily concerned with these questions of domestic institutional
design.68 It is, however, important to mention again Pogge’s point that
67 I am indebted to Tim Mulgan for pointing out to me this interesting argument in support of my claim
that practical reasoning cannot be a goal of global justice in the form of a mere capability people
possess.
68 This does not imply anything about the stringency and urgency of the better-off’s obligations of
justice to assist the poor with establishing just domestic institutions. Since the subject-matter of these
obligations is of a very different kind than the one I am primarily concerned with here, i.e. material
resources and financial means, I put the obligations concerned with the non-material prerequisites for
58
international practices such as the “resource” and “borrowing privileges” have
a negative impact on the implementation of just domestic institutions
mentioned by Nussbaum with regards to securing affiliation and critical
discourse in poor societies. It is my idea to assume that better-off societies, as
far as the global order has contributed to corrupt local political and social
institutions, have an obligation of justice to assist poor societies with
establishing just domestic institutions. This issue is not my primary concern
here though. I admit that especially with regard to the capability of affiliation
and the related social institutions the material prerequisites might actually play
a less important role than the non-material prerequisites that cannot be
redistributed from better-off to poor societies in a direct way.
8. Other Species: This capability emphasises the importance of our ability to
live in a safe and protected environment, especially in a functioning bio-
sphere with plants and animals.69 As Nussbaum consents this is certainly the
most disputed member of her list of basic human functionings. China’s ruling
class, for example, gives priority to economic growth at the expense of this
capability. This capability, especially when it is defined in Nussbaum’s more
advanced sense, is also the one that is most problematic with regard to the
harm-connection – crucial for my approach of identifying the current global
order as unjust. Whether not being able to live in valuable relationships with
animals and in accordance with an almost romantic – in the sense of the
eighteenth century German movement – conception of valuing nature counts
as a cross-culturally accepted instance of harm seems questionable.70
central capabilities to one side. It is important to keep in mind that basic needs cosmopolitanism, as
presented here, is not a complete theory of global justice.
69 Nussbaum does not address the issue of biocentrism but her anthropocentric overall approach makes
me inclined to say that other species and nature in general only have instrumental value in making a
life a truly human one. Her approach certainly does not exclude biocentrism; but it does not imply it
either. The problem is that also on a purely instrumental account of the value of nature and other
species it is not obvious that relationships with other species must be on a list of basic needs or central
human functional capabilities. Nussbaum’s argument clearly seems to work in cases of massive
environmental damage that has harmful effects on human beings (this is important for me because only
if environmental damage can be linked to human “harm” it becomes a matter of (global) justice). I do
not see how curtailed relationships with other species constitute a matter of justice (if we exclude the
cases where this curtailing results in harm).
70 Nussbaum recognises this point: “In terms of cross-cultural development, this has been the most
controversial item on the list (…). Norway, for example, places tremendous emphasis on this
capability. In Oslo one may build only within five miles of the coast; past that ‘forest line,’ the inland
mountainous region is kept free of habitation to preserve spaces for people to enjoy solitude in the
forest, a central aspect of this capability, as Norwegians specify it.” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 80) These
remarks provoke two response: Firstly, many people will regard the capability of enjoying solitude in
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9. Play: the capability to laugh, play and perform recreational activities is
important because of its relationship to affiliative activities and child
development. The worry whether a shortfall within this capability constitutes
an instance of harm also applies to this capability.
10. Control over one’s environment: A. Political: Nussbaum connects basic
human functional capabilities with the idea of democracy and political
autonomy. The justification for this connection are the effects of political
decisions on individual lives. To be in full control over one’s life means to
have the capability to participate in democratic decisions. B. Material: The
ability to hold property and to have property rights on an equal basis with
others are regarded as important elements of a society’s basic structure
protecting the capabilities for truly human functioning. As mentioned above in
connection with affiliation basic needs cosmopolitanism can be concerned
with this capability only indirectly. When the global order can be blamed for
deficits of basic necessities that are the prerequisite for just domestic
institutions and legal regimes the global order counts as unjust and as one
generating obligations of distributive justice to compensate for these deficits.
Other possible obligations of non-distributive justice such as an obligation to
support (or even to initiate) local political movements that struggle for the
establishment of just domestic institutions are not excluded by basic needs
cosmopolitanism, however.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to this essay’s critical question of how the
capability approach provides the most suitable standard in order to judge whether the
current global economic practices and regimes harm the poor. Derived from this
standard basic needs cosmopolitanism then determines what material (and non-
material) prerequisites are necessary to secure these capabilities for all. In proportion
to their responsibility for basic necessities shortfalls abroad the better-off are required
on grounds of justice to compensate for the imposition of an unjust global order. This
final step is done in the concluding section of this essay. Before doing that we have to
get clearer about how the capability list provides a cross-cultural standard for
the forest as not harm-related and parochial. Many cultural backgrounds are not prepared to put that
much emphasis on individual retreat. Secondly, one might argue that the ten capabilities on
Nussbaum’s list do not have equal priority and that the other-species-capability has to give way to
securing other, more basic, capabilities.
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assessing the global order’s negative impact on poor societies. In a nutshell the
negative impact basic needs cosmopolitanism is concerned with is related to the
material and non-material prerequisites for possessing the ten central capabilities, that
must be present in every truly human life. My definition of “basic needs” is that the
need for these prerequisites is one that must be fulfilled in order to avoid instances of
severe harm and deprivation, rendering the quality of the lives in question
unacceptable from a cross-cultural perspective. Without the right and sufficient
material basic necessities and in the absence of minimally just domestic political and
social institutions people do not live in circumstance enabling the possession of these
capabilities (and, as I want to stress again in the next paragraphs, in some cases
actually achieved functionings).
In order to address these issues I need to come back to my major point of
internal criticism of the capability approach, namely the distinction between
functionings and capabilities. Sen and Nussbaum claim that it is only capabilities and
not actual functionings that are the proper objective of assessing the standard of living
of individuals. Nussbaum stresses her agreement with Sen when she says, “for
political purposes it is appropriate that we shoot for capabilities, and those alone.”71
The capability approach explains this stance with a commitment to pluralism and non-
paternalism. Here Nussbaum explicitly adopts another idea of Rawlsian political
liberalism. Social primary goods have to be assigned to each citizen on an equal basis
by the state or whatever institution is responsible for this assignment. It is, however,
not the state’s business to enforce the actual use of these primary goods by each
citizen. It is up to the individuals to decide, in light of their comprehensive
conceptions of the good life, whether or not they make use of the distributed goods,
liberties and opportunities.
Nussbaum claims that this Rawlsian approach suits well with the capability
approach’s political focus on capabilities, not functionings. I interpret Nussbaum to
the effect that she regards capabilities as opportunities that must be at the citizens’
disposal. A state guaranteeing the material and non-material prerequisites of the ten
capabilities is a just state, at least from the political point of view of the “basic-
structure of society”. We can imagine a society where a large portion of the citizenry
does not regard one or more of the ten capabilities as crucial and does not make use of
71 Ibid., p. 87.
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the provided opportunities. This is no reason for condemning this society as long as
the society’s basic structure has provided the citizens with the full social basis of
these capabilities, so Nussbaum’s argument goes. Of course, Nussbaum believes that
due to the strong and complex interrelation of the members of her capability list, it
will not often be the case that a society provides all the prerequisites for central
capabilities and at the same time citizens will not make use of these valuable
opportunities. It is, however, important to stress that Nussbaum presents her version
of the capability approach in a seemingly liberal spirit and this spirit must respect a
society of the kind described in this paragraph.
When we take a closer look at the members of the list of central human
capabilities we see, however, that an absolute exclusion of functionings as political
goals is misguided and actually corrupts Nussbaum’s (and Sen’s) liberal ambitions.
This becomes especially clear when we follow Nussbaum in identifying the two
capabilities that have a special status, namely practical reason and affiliation. These
are of special importance, “since they both organize and suffuse all the others, making
their pursuit truly human.”72 The importance of practical reason and affiliation lies in
them being indispensable prerequisites for planning a life and for critically reflecting
on one’s life plan. A society that secures the eight other capabilities but fails to
provide the conditions for practical as well as discursive reasoning makes available to
its citizens capabilities in a non-human, animal-like variety. Such a society does not
express consideration for its members’ basic standard of living.
Especially in Nussbaum’s (“truly human functioning”) and Sen’s (“capability
as freedom”) versions of the capability approach the notion of choice is of critical
importance – as is also implied by Nussbaum putting so much emphasis on the two
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation. With at least these two capabilities, but
also with mental and bodily health, the political goal must be actual functioning and
not merely an option to function. I agree with Nussbaum that practical reason and
critical reflection are the paramount important members of her list but I disagree with
her justification for that. Nussbaum regards practical reason as important because it
renders the execution of other capabilities “truly human”. I claim that the special
importance of practical reason lies in its fundamental role in making the other
capabilities real capabilities and valuable options to choose from in the first place.
72 Ibid., p. 82.
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When Nussbaum puts so much emphasis on her liberally minded anti-paternalism she
can do that only when citizens are actually autonomous beings and are actually
performing acts of practical reasoning. I find it very difficult to regard practical
reason and affiliation as “capabilities”, as options to function in a particular way that
someone can go for or not. It seems odd to utter the statement according to which one
has the capability to function as an autonomous chooser but can also autonomously
decline to function as such a chooser. The same counts for the capability of affiliation
when it is in fact so important for adequately reflecting upon one’s life and one’s
priorities. How can we regard an individual’s rejection to transform a provided
capability into the corresponding functioning as justified when the same individual
does not actually affiliate with others in order to participate in rational discourses?
Hence, the importance of some capabilities lies exactly in the fact that the
corresponding doings and states are only of value when they are actually achieved in
the form of functionings. Their value lies in making the general notion of “capability”
possible in the first place. Nussbaum (and Sen) do not pay enough attention to this
aspect of the capability approach.
When the conception of the “autonomous chooser” and activities such as
practical reasoning and participating in intersubjective discourse are prerequisites for
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach then this has effects on other capabilities
as well. Functioning in accordance with minimal standards of mental and physical
health, actually being in a state of receiving or having received at least a similar basic
level of education and knowledge, and being in a stable emotional condition now
appear to be better conceived of as functionings which every normal citizen must
actually execute or be in to lead a “truly human life”. These functionings are of high
political priority and concern. Not executing them is an instance of severe damage
and deprivation.
It would be unfair on my part to conceal that Nussbaum’s later writings have
partly addressed these worries.73 Not only does Nussbaum admit that from the
theoretical point of view functionings are the more fundamental elements within the
capability approach - first we have to determine what functionings are a) valuable and
b) cross-cultural universal; Nussbaum also admits that, for example in the case of
children, functionings and not capabilities are the adequate and justified political goal.
73 Ibid., pp. 86-96.
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Still, she insists that “[W]here adult citizens are concerned, capability, not
functioning, is the appropriate political goal. This is so because of the great
importance the approach attaches to practical reason, as a good that both suffuses all
the other functions, making them human rather than animal, and figures itself as a
central function on the list.”74 I have difficulties in following Nussbaum’s remarks
concluding this passage, when she again claims that, even in the case of practical
reason and the related functionings that make practical reason possible, only
capabilities are the goal of political action and redistributive policies. Her emphasis
on respecting moral persons and their free choices is, I claim, not reconcilable with
excluding functionings per se from the domain of state-responsibilities and from the
evaluation of domestic and global distributive institutions with regards to justice.
With these remarks I finish the internal criticisms of the capability approach and
conclude this section with finally introducing my argument tying together the
concepts “capability”, “functionings”, “basic needs”, “harm” and “injustice”.
Concerning the evaluation of the current global order we can now bring the
combination of my Poggean definition of an unjust global order in terms of avoidable
harm with Nussbaum’s capability approach to an end. Possessing Nussbaum’s ten
members of her list of central human functional capabilities is a cross-culturally
acceptable precondition of every truly human life. I agree with Nussbaum’s argument
in support of “capability-universalism” and am sympathetic with her unconventional
method of using a combination of intuitions, reflective equilibrium and sources of
world literature. She is successful in showing that people not possessing essential
capabilities are deprived of a truly human life. In discussing her list I noted that some
members of the list are more undisputed (bodily and mental health, practical reason,
basic education) than others (other species, play). In order to establish the following
conclusion concerning the relationship between needs and these capabilities we do not
have to dedicate too much space to the issue of what basic capabilities and
functionings are fully cross-culturally acceptable and which are not. I am confident
that her list does not include too little – among her ten capabilities are certainly the
most basic ones. The list might consist of too many capabilities but this is an issue not
decidable by the philosopher alone in any event (remember the difficulties concerning
defining a minimal average life expectancy etc.). In order to establish the first crucial
74 Ibid., p. 87. [Emphasis in the original.]
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conclusion in support of basic needs cosmopolitanism it suffices to assume that the
most basic capabilities on Nussbaum’s list are harm-related – the harm-relation being
the crucial link to the concept of “global injustice”.75
With regard to basic needs cosmopolitanism the important point about
Nussbaum’s central capabilities is the following: in order for individual citizens to
possess capabilities their society must be able to provide specific material and non-
material prerequisites in a specific quantity and quality. The central capabilities –
again, in this case the actually functioning seems to be the more adequate goal to me -
of physical and mental health for example require material prerequisites in the form of
financial and technical resources, know-how, the necessary educational facilities to
educate medical personal etc.. These material prerequisites are necessary but not
sufficient preconditions for making the functioning of being in a healthy physical
condition available to all. Non-material prerequisites such as a minimally egalitarian
state-funded health system and non-discrimination76, when it comes to access to these
state-funded services, are the other necessary preconditions to secure Nussbaum’s
capabilities and functionings for all. The presence of the threshold quantity and
quality of these material and nonmaterial prerequisites taken together are sufficient to
render a society into a just one – at least with regard to these central capabilities. I
summarise the material prerequisites under the heading of “basic necessities”. A just
society possesses enough basic necessities and these necessities are equally enough
distributed within this society (this is a non-material prerequisite) so that all members
possess the most basic central capabilities in question. Consequently, I define a basic
human need as the individual need to have equal and secured access to this threshold
quantity and quality of basic necessities. Without having access to these basic
necessities individuals cannot possess the related basic capabilities and functionings.77
75 The injustice I am concerned with here is only one obligation-of-justice-related case. Coercion,
deception, theft, etc. of course also generate obligations of justice and can be a very relevant issue in
international relations. I am concerned with a particular kind of global injustice, related to deficits in
the domain of basic needs caused by other moral agents.
76 Nussbaum’s Women and Human Development pays particular attention to the case of women in
India. Nussbaum draws attention to research indicating the gender-biased obstacles women face in
accessing health care facilities. The same counts for other capabilities and functionings, the most
prominent one being basic education. (Nussbaum 2000, pp. 24)
77 One must not ignore the corresponding case when an individual has secured access to basic
necessities but not to the non-material prerequisites. A wealthy member of an ethnic minority can have
the material resources available and the society she lives in can also have all the material resources at
hand to secure the capability for all. The same society can, however, deny this person equal access to
public services. In this case the material prerequisites are all present but due to the lack of non-material
prerequisites (non-discriminatory institutions) some members do not possess the central capability in
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Consequently, since not having these capabilities and functionings constitutes an
instance of harm, not having access to basic necessities constitutes an instance of
harm as well.
The Poggean element of basic needs cosmopolitanism enters the picture when
the global economic order, its institutions and legal regimes, can be entirely or partly
blamed for this shortage of basic necessities. At the end of chapter one I reinterpreted
Pogge’s definition of an unjust global order; where he takes the fulfilment of social
and economic human rights as the standard for assessing the justice of the global
order I prefer to employ the notion of meeting basic needs, a notion that can now be
fully developed. If it is in fact the case that international trade- and tariff- regimes
harm the poor by not making secure and equal access to basic necessities possible for
all then an imposition of such an order by the better-off societies constitutes the
violation of a negative obligation. In conjunction with other things I said in chapter
one I derive a stringent obligation of distributive justice from this claim. If the
imposed global order is unjust then the better-off are required on grounds of justice to
stop imposing that order and are required to compensate for past and continuing
injustices in proportion to their responsibility for the resulting basic needs shortfalls.
The next and final section of this essay is intended to refine this approach by
introducing the notion of “potential functionings” – which must not be confused with
my criticisms of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s exclusion of actually achieved functionings
from the group of legitimate political goals. The notion of “potential functionings” is
supposed to give an account of when a poor society can be regarded as having
sufficient basic necessities at hand in order to discharge its obligations towards its
own citizens and guarantee their capabilities and functionings. Only when a society
possesses the basic necessities required to secure potential functionings it can secure
its citizens capabilities.78 And only when the global order allows poor societies to
question. In most real-world cases today poor societies are confronted with a deficit in both spheres –
basic necessities and non-material prerequisites for securing capabilities – and there is reason to believe
that both factors are at least mutually reinforcing. This fact suffices to make the part of basic needs
cosmopolitanism presented in this essay, with its emphasis on basic necessities only, work.
78 As a matter of fact, the institution with most “distributive authority” (still) is the traditional nation
state. The state - its political and social institutions - is responsible for structuring the distribution of
basic necessities. Even a very libertarian society, allowing only a small amount of redistributive
schemes, still assigns the final say about how much redistribution is permissible to the state. That the
(democratically legitimized) state is the ultimate authority with regards to distributive arrangements is
a central and indispensable element of modern state-sovereignty. All this does not, however, diminish
the adequacy of this essay’s argument. The global order has a significant impact on a) the quality of
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have this quantity and quality of basic necessities at hand (and is governed by
domestic social and political institutions committed to securing central capabilities for
all) can it count as a minimally just one. To this complex notion of potential
functionings I now turn.
domestic institutions and b) on the quantity and quality of basic necessities that this society’s state can
distribute domestically in order to satisfy basic needs.
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II.III. “Potential Functionings” and the Obligation to Meet Others’ Basic Needs
Let us summarise the features of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach that I
employ in order to answer the question of how to discharge the obligation of justice to
assist the global poor in confronting severe poverty; poverty to which, following
Pogge’s empirical claims, better-off societies and the global political and economic
order have contributed to. Sen and Nussbaum convincingly argue that in order to
determine levels of poverty one has to find a cross-culturally accessible balance
between subjective and objective ways of measuring and comparing living standards.
In particular, Sen points to the various difficulties that go along with positions such as
utilitarian and commodity-focused approaches. He claims that comparing individuals’
capability sets – the various combinations of functionings individuals are able to
achieve - is the best way to determine who is better and who is worse-off.
Nussbaum goes one step further and introduces a definite list of doings and
states that are indispensable features of every truly human life. In addition, she gives a
justification for the list’s universal and global applicability in analysing well-being
and living standards. Moreover, the capabilities on the list are the foundation of
citizens’ legitimate claims against their societies and states. Every citizen should be
entitled to a constitutionally guaranteed support in order to attain the material and
non-material prerequisites for possessing these capabilities. My criticisms have
pointed out that in many cases it is actually achieved functionings and not the
corresponding capabilities that should be the political goals of collective distributive
and redistributive action. This counts especially for the doings and states defining the
“rational and autonomous chooser” who must actually function as such in order to
make the notions of “choice” and “capability” work in the first place.
Except for this criticism I regard the capability approach as the most
promising starting point for establishing what I call “basic needs cosmopolitanism”.
In fact, the differences between the capability approach and basic needs theories are
diminishing especially when the capability approach is restricted to universal and
central capabilities (and actual functionings), as it is done by Nussbaum’s studies on
human development. The basic needs literature79 is to a significant extent concerned
with the question of how we can distinguish basic human needs from individuals’
79 An overview of the current debate is provided by Brock 1998.
68
preferences. Only needs are regarded as making special moral and political claims on
others. Preferences are regarded as not generating “urgent” claims of aid, following
Scanlon, because one could have not developed these interests.80 Basic needs are
unavoidable and inherent features of every truly human life and notions such as
“choice” and “voluntariness” do not apply to them as they do in the case of
preferences. Other basic needs theories claim that the lack of rational autonomy and
that the unmet status of autonomy-enabling needs constitute a shortfall within the
category of basic needs.81 The basic needs theories I employ in order to judge the
global economic and political order as just or unjust focus on what happens when
needs, desires, and preferences are not met or satisfied. These theories identify only
those needs, desires, and preferences as basic ones that result in instances of bodily
and mental harm if they go unmet.82 Subjective preferences lack this property. When
preferences or non-basic needs go unmet what results is dissatisfaction or unhappiness
but not harm, severe bodily and mentally damage, or injury.
My interpretation of Nussbaum’s and Sen’s capability approaches works in
similar ways. Nussbaum’s list of central human functional capabilities is supposed to
enumerate features of human lives that derive their special importance from what
happens when individuals do not possess these capabilities and, as I wish to add in the
most basic cases, do not function accordingly. The need for these capabilities’ and
functionings’ material and non-material prerequisites, the access to which is a
necessary condition for possessing these capabilities, I define as basic needs. Since
not possessing these central capabilities constitutes instances of harm, not having
access to the related basic necessities and not being governed by just domestic
institutions counts as harm as well. Nussbaum’s excurses into world-literature are
supposed to show that human beings of diverse cultural backgrounds react similarly
80 Scanlon 1975, p. 665. I cannot here dedicate the space to do justice to Scanlon’s complex theory of
“Preference and Urgency”. For a criticism of Scanlon’s point according to which it is not the fact that
an interest is voluntarily chosen that renders it into a non-urgent preference see Cohen 1989, pp. 935-
941. Scanlon suggests that preferences do not generate claims of aid because of their idiosyncratic
character, i.e. because they are interests that could have arisen. Since they might not have arisen
Scanlon concludes that, from an objective perspective, these interests are of “peripheral importance”
regardless of how strongly the individual in question desires their fulfilment.
81 Copp 1998 [1992], pp. 115-123.
82 Frankfurt 1998 [1984], pp. 23-26. Frankfurt introduces the “Principle of Precedence” establishing the
claim that in case of conflict between needs and desires, meeting needs takes precedence over desires.
Frankfurt, however, observes that only needs falling under two conditions deserve the protection of the
principle of precedence. A need is morally important only if a) harm will result if the need is not met
and b) when that harm is outside a person’s voluntary control. For a similar harm-based account of the
concept of “needs” see Wiggins 1998 [1991], pp. 32-41.
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when they are confronted with human fates and tragedies – when humans are
deprived of central capabilities and hindered to live a fully human life - as they are
depicted in works of art. Human beings have a need to posses central capabilities and
to reach a level of minimal functioning in certain core areas of their existence in order
to live a life on their own and according to their own conception of the good life. I try
to find a place for basic needs in this picture by stressing that without secured access
to their material and non-material prerequisites the possession of these capabilities
and a truly human life are not possible.
In order to establish the final element of basic needs cosmopolitanism, namely
the notion of “potential functionings”, I have to dedicate some more space to the
relationship between the concept of “basic needs” on the one hand and capabilities
and functionings on the other. In the preceding sections I have introduced and
defended the claim that the global order counts as unjust insofar as it renders the
possession of central human functional capabilities impossible or difficult. Possessing
these capabilities is only possible when a society can secure the material and the non-
material prerequisites necessary for its citizens in order to possess these capabilities. I
now want to examine the question of when exactly a society can be regarded as
sufficiently well-off, within this framework of central capabilities and the related
basic needs, in order to count as not being harmed by the global order. Consistent
with this dissertation’s overall focus on distributive justice I focus on the satisfaction
of material basic needs, i.e. needs that must be satisfied so that all citizens have at
least the material prerequisites for central capabilities secured.
The notion of “potential functionings” is supposed to answer the question of
when a society is sufficiently well-off and is capable of securing the material
prerequisites necessary for its citizens to possess Nussbaum’s universal central
capabilities. I will argue that only when potential functionings are secured for all
members of a society can we say that this society can meet all its citizens’ basic
needs. I claim that a society cannot meet its citizens’ basic needs when its citizens do
not have a choice between functioning and non-functioning in a fundamentally
important domain of physical and psychological life due to the society-wide lack of
the necessary quality and quantity of material prerequisites that would have to be
available if all citizens were to transform their capability into the corresponding
functioning. This is why I will emphasise the importance of potential functionings at
this point.
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The notion of potential functionings spells out in more detail the link between
the capability approach and basic needs. The capability approach is generally
associated with comparisons of individual levels of well-being and living standard
assessments. In what follows I show that the advantages of the capability approach
can be secured while accommodating at the same time the more common perspective
adopted when issues of international development are discussed, namely the
perspective of comparisons focusing on the overall economic and social situation of
societies and states. The standard of potential functionings is concerned with specific
individuals and their particular basic-needs-situation only indirectly, namely as far as
they are members of particular societies. The perspective adopted in the remainder of
this argument is a political, society-wide, one. The question of whether a country and
their citizenry are able to satisfy their basic needs – and are sufficiently well-off to
secure the possession of central capabilities – is addressed in terms of society-
comparisons and not by assessing individual citizens’ situations in isolation from each
other. This perspective is not only preferable because it is the current practical
political framework for discussing developmental issues; it is so also because whether
an individual can meet her basic needs in a sustainable way depends to a large extent
on the society she lives in; how well-off this society is overall and how the state
distributes and redistributes available resources. This is the perspective better-off
states are primarily concerned with when confronting the negative impact of the
global order.
The perspective is “political” and “social” because the society-wide
perspective is not satisfied with particular individual citizens having enough food,
receiving basic education etc.. The political perspective wants to know whether the
same threshold level within the sphere of basic capabilities can be achieved for all
citizens of a poor society. Some members of a poor society may possesses all central
capabilities but many others do not. Without secured potential functionings for all
members of a poor society, so I will argue below, one cannot say that all individuals
possess the corresponding central capabilities and this is exactly the property that the
global order must allow all societies to exhibit in order to count as minimally just.
In short the point I want to make with introducing the notion of “potential
functionings” is that a society can only be regarded as consisting of members with
complete central capabilities sets when in this society all citizens would be able to
achieve full functioning in Nussbaum’s ten categories of central doings and states if
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all citizens were to transform their central capabilities into the corresponding
functionings. The argument for this claim runs as follows: an individual only has the
capability to X when there is also the actual functioning X available to her in the form
of an achievable option. Without the actual functioning’s availability the individual
cannot be regarded as having a real choice between going for X and not going for X.
To have this choice is, however, exactly what “having the capability to X” means.
Imagine a society consisting of one hundred members. The society has the
basic necessities (the material prerequisites) available for securing functioning X for
ninety-nine of its members. Suppose that eighty members actually want to achieve
functioning X and twenty do not want functioning X and all are satisfied with that
state of affairs (for example eighty want to be adequately nourished, twenty are
fasting religious believers). Is this society in a material condition to secure capability
X for all its citizens? The answer has to be no. In fact, especially if we suppose that
this society meets its citizens’ needs for the non-material prerequisites for central
capabilities, i.e. is committed to a principle of equal respect and consideration (and
this seems a plausible thing to suppose in the case of entitlements to basic
necessities), then this society is not able to secure capability X for a single one of its
members. For if all one hundred actually decided to transform their “capability” to X
into the corresponding actual functioning X, not a single member could be sure that it
will not be her who will be the one who does not achieve functioning X because of
the lack of the material preconditions necessary to secure X for all, one hundred,
members. The potential availability of functioning X for all members is what I call
“potential functionings”.
I have to confront weighty objections to my conception of “potential
functionings”.83 One might claim that it is not necessary that a society can secure
potential functionings for all in order to count as a society that secures the
corresponding capabilities for all. With regard to my example, so the criticism goes,
the answer has to be “yes” because as a matter of fact all citizens, the eighty who
want to nourish themselves properly and the twenty fasting believers, have their
capability to be well-nourished secured. An example that is supposed to strengthen
this criticism is the capability to “take a walk on the beach”. Even if it is true that not
all citizens can transform this capability into the corresponding actually achieved
83 I am indebted to Tim Mulgan for introducing the two following examples and the related criticisms
of potential functionings to me.
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functioning at the same time, we are saying that all citizens are free to take a walk on
the beach and posses the capability to do so. This example seems to weaken my
argument from potential functionings that insists that a society must have at least
enough and as good basic necessities at hand that would be necessary to secure the
actually achieved functioning for all (if all decided to do so) in order to count as a
society that secures the corresponding capability for all, i.e. that all have the option
available to go for the functioning in question.
Concerning this counterexample I should say that my argument from potential
functionings works best with a) central (basic, harm-related) capabilities and b) with
the subgroup of central capabilities the securement of which is strongly dependent on
the provision of (these capabilities’) material prerequisites. The example of
“possessing the capability to take a walk on the beach whenever one wants to do so”
is neither a central one nor is its society-wide securement really dependent on the
overall material situation of the society in question. The non-material prerequisites
that have to be present in order to secure the capability to take a walk are certainly
important ones. We can imagine an authoritarian regime that prohibits, let us say,
citizens to take a walk on the beach on Thursdays. If the capability to take a walk on
the beach whenever one wants to do so counted as a central, harm-related, one and if
the global order could be blamed for fostering such unjust domestic regimes than the
better-off, imposing this global order, would indeed have an obligation of justice to do
something about this injustice and render the non-material prerequisites for this
capability (i.e. just domestic institutions allowing all to take a walk whenever they
want to do so) accessible. I have doubts, however, whether this capability is harm-
related enough to count as a central one. What renders a capability into a central one
is exactly the fact that all citizens must “activate” it within a similar time frame in
order not to be deprived of human essentials such as bodily and mental health. This is
the case with the capability to be well-nourished but not with the capability to take a
walk on the beach.
A good like university education might be another example capable of
showing that potential functionings for all cannot be the proper standard in order to
judge that all society-members possess a particular capability. With regard to the
capability to attend institutions of higher education, it is enough that everyone has a
fair opportunity to attend a university; it cannot be the goal of a just society that it has
so many material resources available that all citizens could attend universities at the
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same time if they wanted to do so. This example is more relevant to my argument
since it is in fact concerned with a capability that is strongly related to a society’s
material situation. Contrary to the capability of taking a walk, the capability to attend
a university is conditional on the society in question having a certain quantity and
quality of material resources at hand (financial means, competent educational and
scientific personal, infrastructure, etc.). What makes the counterexample not work,
however, is that the capability to attend universities is a non-basic one. A society that
“only” has enough resources at hand to secure the actual functioning of “attending a
university” for a certain number of qualified citizens does not fail the potential
functionings test. It does not constitute an instance of severe bodily or mental harm if
someone, having equal chances to prepare and apply for higher education, does not
actually function on this level.84
Let me try to make this point clearer by contrasting the capability to attend a
university with the central and basic capability to receive elementary education. In
discussing Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities I stressed that the lack of
rudimentary school education in fact constitutes an instance of harm. This is so
because not being able to read, write, and having a minimal level of mathematical
skills renders the global poor into extremely vulnerable participants in the system of
global politics and economics. Securing the potential functionings for all citizens of a
poor society in this sphere is then in fact a minimal requirement for a just global
order. A poor society can only be regarded as one that is well-off enough if it had all
the basic necessities at hand that would be necessary to allow all citizens to receive
basic education. In the case of the capability to receive basic education I therefore
defend my demanding baseline of potential functionings. Also, and this is the crucial
idea underlying the conception of “potential functionings”, someone opting not to
receive basic education only has the capability to do so secured if she has the option
of actually receiving basic education available to her. It is my interpretation of the
notion of “possessing a central capability” that one must live in a society that has the
material prerequisites available that are necessary to transform the capability into the
corresponding functioning.
84 A poor society that is not able to offer any higher education at all poses different questions though.
In this case an argument applies that is similar to the one in favour of universal basic education. A
society not being well-off enough to have any institutions of critical scientific research, not even ones
that can participate within the global scientific community passively, is a vulnerable economic and
political actor. Such a society, as far as its lack of scientific institutions is due to the global order’s
negative effects, is entitled to some compensation on grounds of justice.
74
This claim is consistent with individuals actually not making use of some of
their central capabilities, i.e. not transforming their capabilities into the corresponding
functionings. Again, imagine a society consisting of one hundred members. Not
everyone in this society wants a basic education (again this is a problematic claim,
especially with regard to children and the importance of having actually received
basic education as a prerequisite for making the notions of “capability” and “informed
choice” (the choice between making use of one’s capabilities or not) work). Let us
suppose, for the sake of argument, that all one hundred individuals are mature adults
when they decide whether to receive basic education or not. In addition, the following
claims are true with regard to this society: (1) everyone who wants a basic education
gets one; and (2), for each individual who does not want a basic education, it is the
case that, if they had wanted a basic education, then they would have received one. In
our case that could mean that there are one hundred places in school available, but
only ninety-nine places are taken.
That our hundred-members-society, as described in the preceding paragraph,
is perfectly just (at least concerning the prerequisites for the capability of receiving
basic education) is exactly the idea of potential functionings. In order for (1) and (2)
to count as true properties of that society it must have sufficient material and adequate
non-material prerequisites available for all, one hundred, members. In order to say
that the one single member abstaining from attending school “would have been able
to receive basic education if she had wanted to do so” (and that is exactly what it
means to “have the capability”) her society must had been able to provide the
hundredth place for her. If the society had not been able to do so, i.e. had been able to
secure ninety nine places only, she would not have been able to take her place. Since
“having the capability to receive basic education” means to have the choice between
attending and not attending school, and we want all society-members to have this
capability (not necessarily the actually achieved corresponding functioning – which is
again problematic with regard to basic education), the notion of potential functionings
enters the picture at this point. When the resources are available for one hundred
school-places the society in question lives up to the idea of secured potential
functionings regardless of whether ninety-nine students attend or one hundred. Things
become problematic when a central capability such as “receiving basic education”
cannot be secured for every member of a society and this is the case when our model-
society can provide ninety-nine places only. Under these social circumstances the
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hundredth individual cannot assent to the statement “if I had wanted a basic
education, then I would have received one” and the society in question cannot be
regarded as being able to secure her capability to do so. It is not necessary, at least not
within the context of the example currently discussed, that all one hundred attend
school and actually perform this functioning; it is necessary that all one hundred have
the capability to do so and this is only the case when there are enough and as good
prerequisites for this capability available for all. Only when the actual functioning is
available as an obtainable option one can be regarded as possessing the related
capability. That is the reason why, in cases such as the capabilities “to be well-
nourished” and “to receive basic education”, I do not regard central capabilities as
secured for all if a society does not have the quantity and quality of basic necessities
at hand (and exhibits minimally just domestic institutions) that would be necessary if
all were to actually function in these domains. Only if these material and non-material
prerequisites are available, all citizens have the choice of whether they activate their
capability or not.
The third example of capabilities, discussed above concerned with basic
education, suggests another point worth discussing. For the sake of argument I
assumed that the one hundred members are free to decide whether to transform their
capability to attend school into the corresponding actual functioning or not. The more
basic a specific capability is, however, the more important it becomes that citizens are
not merely having the capability but actually function in the domain in question. It
was one of my major criticisms of Nussbaum’s approach that it disallows central
functionings as a political goal and focuses on capabilities only. With regard to our
example of “receiving basic education” this criticism applies as well. Since, as I have
assumed in discussing Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, having received a minimal
level of basic education is a prerequisite for commanding one’s life properly it seems
reasonable to require all citizens to actually go through a process of basic education.
(The prime argument for compulsory school education is built around this idea.)
What does this imply for the role of potential functionings within basic needs
cosmopolitanism? Since the most basic capabilities (nourishing, education, medical
services, etc.) are so much an essential part of every normal human life they have in
fact to be present in the form of actually achieved functionings. Take for example the
capability of being adequately nourished: Since being adequately nourished is a
prerequisite for an enduring and enjoyable life all human beings will have to transfer
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this capability into the corresponding actual functioning. In this case it seems
redundant to care about potential functionings. Since all humans have to eat properly
in order to stay alive, the instances of human beings not nourishing themselves
properly point directly to the absence of the capability to be well-nourished. The
portion of people not actually functioning within this domain and the portion of
people lacking the capability to be well nourished seem to be coextensive. What work
does the idea of potential functionings do in such basic cases?
This is a strong criticism of my approach. I nevertheless think that potential
functionings are crucially relevant from the perspective of better-off states asking
whether the global order harms the poor or not. As my discussion of Nussbaum’s list
indicated “adaptive preferences” pose a problem for identifying universal standards
for deciding when a society and their citizens count as being harmed by the global
order. Consider the case of women in many poor countries who do not seem to
“want” to receive basic education because of cultural and social circumstances
peculiar to traditional patriarchal societies. Should better-off societies take these
adaptive preferences into consideration when they examine the global order’s effect
on poor societies so that the minimal society-wide quality and quantity of resources,
required to secure capabilities, becomes an extremely relative and flexible measure?
Patriarchal country M and liberal country N, both having one hundred inhabitants
(fifty male and fifty female), would then have a very different demand of resources
necessary in order to secure basic education for all who actually “want” to receive it.
The idea of potential functionings ignores adaptive preferences. With the
capability of being well-nourished this is evident. With other capabilities, such as
basic education, things are more difficult as Nussbaum’s extensive treatment of
women in India shows. Better-off societies should not evaluate the capability-
situation of India’s women from the perspective of Indian society; when better-off
states ask whether the global order harms the poor they should rather employ, as far
as possible, standards similar to their own societies. The quality and quantity of the
specific basic necessities that are required for basic (not higher!) education for all
citizens that counts as an acceptable quality and quantity should be similar across the
world.85 This quality and quantity will be very different when this universal standard
is employed in comparison to employing local standards that are themselves the result
85 For why egalitarian global standards are especially important with regard to basic education see
footnote 65.
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of long lasting deprivation and inequality. When it comes to basic education, health
care, nutrition, etc. the standard of potential functionings, with its assumption that all
members of society should have the bundle of material and non-material resources at
hand that would be necessary if they actually all functioned in that domain, seems
therefore adequate from the perspective adopted in this essay. This much paternalism
is justified especially because, as long as we are debating transfers that are a matter of
compensation and justice, the better-off have not much of a say in transferring their
compensation conditionally. Of course, this is again the point where the non-material
prerequisites for capabilities come into play. We do not want the material transfers to
do more harm than good. This shows again the necessity for the better-off to take care
of the non-material, social and political, situation of poor countries. The idea of
potential functionings on its own is merely applied as a standard for determining how
much harm is inflicted upon poor societies with regard to their material situation and
assuming that the non-material prerequisites are already secured, i.e. a just domestic
basic structure has been established. As will be shown below, the level of
compensation that is required on grounds of justice mirrors the better-off’s
responsibility for the poor societies’ material shortfall from the level of basic
necessities that would be required to secure potential functionings for all. This
standard taken by itself only determines the required transfers’ quantity but not how
the transfers should be spent by the receiving countries and their governments. The
latter issue is, again, connected to a large extent to the non-material prerequisites for
society-wide possession of central capabilities.
The idea of potential functionings is then not only helpful with identifying the
detrimental effects of the current global order; derived from that, it can give an
account of the better-off societies’ resources they have to transfer to poor societies in
order to discharge their obligations of distributive justice. The resulting requirement
of these transfers is then, for example, that developing country R should receive the
level of material resources necessary to lift all of its citizens above the threshold of
possessing Nussbaum’s capabilities (and, in some cases, functionings). On grounds of
justice the better-off are required to transfer basic necessities in proportion to their
and the global order’s responsibility for R’s lack of the material prerequisites. If the
better-off cannot be blamed for a full, 100%, responsibility for this shortage – this
“smaller-than-100%-responsibility” seems to be the likely one in real world
applications – they are still asked on grounds of beneficence to transfer assistance to
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help the poor with meeting their basic needs if they can do so without big sacrifices in
addition to the justice-based compensation. I cannot give the separate justification for
this beneficence-based portion of the global obligation to meet others’ basic needs
here. Some ideas were presented in this essay’s first chapter.
So basic needs re-enter the picture when we ask at what point the people of R
are sufficiently well-off so that they have the central capabilities on Nussbaum’s list. I
have argued that we can answer this question positively only when we consider R’s
“potential functionings” and can consent to the following statement: “If all people of
R decided to actually function X then they would all have the necessary material
prerequisites for functioning X at their disposal.” Only when we can assent to this
statement concerning potential functionings - i.e. R has enough material resources so
that all citizens could actually achieve the central functionings - can we say in the
same breath that all of R’s citizens really possess the corresponding central
capabilities. Their need for the material (and non-material) preconditions necessary to
achieve central functionings are what I have been calling the basic needs of human
beings. Since satisfying these needs is a precondition for possessing capabilities and
for achieving functionings as presented on Nussbaum’s list, we can also claim that
these needs are of the same cross-cultural and universal significance as the related
capabilities. Nussbaum’s justificatory story for her list of central human functional
capabilities carries over to my claim that there are corresponding basic needs that are
of universal and global concern.
The obligation of justice to transfer funds etc. to the poor must therefore be
discharged by compensating basic needs deficits that are due to the global order.
Again, I regard the material preconditions as a necessary but not as a sufficient
condition for providing all citizens of R with the guaranteed option to achieve actual
functionings in core areas of human existence. Take for example Nussbaum’s central
human functional capability of “emotions”. There are material conditions for a normal
individual development in this essential sphere of human life. These material
conditions, like shelter, a stable minimal income, and nourishments are necessary in
order to develop the emotional aspects of one’s personality normally in industrialized
as well as in developing societies. These conditions are, however, not sufficient.
Growing up in a family or a comparable caring institution, the experience of being
loved by an attachment figure, having friends that support and influence each other in
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their emotional development and process of maturation are other, non-material,
ingredients of a normal emotional development.
Only a combination of the provision of these minimal material and non-
material conditions allows a society to claim that it has all the resources at hand to
secure its citizens’ basic functionings and, derived from that, all central capabilities.
What the better-off societies have an obligation to do is to compensate for their
imposition of economic and political arrangements that impair this securement of
functionings and capabilities and to support developing countries in this domestic
project. Most plausibly, parts of this projects will be required of the better-off as a
matter of justice-based compensation and parts will be a matter of beneficence-based
aid. Since it is difficult to conceive of a literal redistribution of the non-material
conditions for basic functionings the focus of discharging obligations of distributive
justice lies on material basic necessities.86 This redistribution is successful if R has the
amount of material conditions for central functioning X at hand that would be
required to allow all its citizens to actually execute functioning X. In this case we can
say that better-off societies have compensated enough and have successfully helped to
contribute to meeting the basic material needs of the people of R, even in the case
where a considerably large portion of R’s citizenry decides – again that implies that
they already function as rational choosers, and all the material and non-material
conditions for this set of functionings are secured – not to actually go for functioning
X. Derived from R’s ability to secure all the preconditions for its citizens to achieve
the functionings incorporated on Nussbaum’s list, we can claim that the better-off
states’ compliance with the part of basic needs cosmopolitanism that is concerned
with material basic needs has successfully contributed to R’s citizens possessing all
central capabilities.
86 See footnote 62 for my reply to the objection that basic needs cosmopolitanism pays too little
attention to the non-material prerequisites for central capabilities and to the related justice-based
obligations. This essay’s focus on the material, distributable, prerequisites does not imply that the
poors’ need for the non-material prerequisites is less urgent and does not absolve the better-off from
worrying about the global order’s effects on this dimension of capability-securement. It is also
important to note that the material and the non-material dimensions of capabilities are significantly
related with each other. One might object at this point that the better-off can affect the distribution of
non-material conditions by redistributing material conditions. This is a fair criticism and it would in
fact be problematic to simply “throw money at the problem” of global poverty without considering
what use will be made of the redistributed material means in a particular society. Both elements of
basic needs cosmopolitanism have to be pursued simultaneously. Just because this essay deals
primarily with the one element concerned with material conditions this does not imply that the
interdependence of the two spheres is not an issue.
89 Nussbaum 2000, pp. 111.
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II.IV. Conclusion: Is Basic Needs Cosmopolitanism Overly Demanding?
In concluding I want to summarise this essay’s main arguments and address some
objections against my theory. One might regard basic needs cosmopolitanism as an
excessively demanding theory of global obligations. Applying Nussbaum’s
comprehensive list of basic functional capabilities as a standard for evaluating the
moral acceptability of the effects of global institutional and legal regimes results in
high demands on a just, or at least “non-unjust”, global order. The more
comprehensive the employed capability list the more difficult it will be for a global
framework of trade regulations and political processes not to impair a society’s access
to basic necessities.
This is even more so because my approach is concerned with what I have
called “potential functionings” for all, i.e. with aiming at a global distribution of basic
necessities that allows poor societies to have at least as much and as good basic
necessities at their disposal that are necessary to secure actually achieved functionings
in central domains of human life. I defend this ambitious threshold because the idea of
“possessing a central capability” only works when all members of a society really
have the corresponding actual functioning available as an option they can go for.
From the perspective of better-off societies the question of whether the current global
political and economic order is an unjust one can be addressed when its effects on
people’s potential functionings and the related basic needs are evaluated. One
advantage of basic needs cosmopolitanism is that it allows the establishment of a
more objective baseline for assessing the global order’s effects on poor societies’
domestic situation with regard to basic necessities. We do not ask whether people are
satisfied with the capability sets they currently hold; what we are concerned with is an
objective limit of resources that is required to secure a cross-culturally attractive list
of central capabilities. That many women in deprived societies do not seem to “want”
to receive basic education is not accepted as justifying a worse off society’s lower
demand for education-related basic necessities. It is the central idea of potential
functionings that we ask what amount and quality of basic necessities would be
required if all children were to attend basic educational institutions and not what
amount is required for the students who actually want to attend school. This much
paternalism is part of basic needs cosmopolitanism.
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This threshold of capabilities’ material and non-material prerequisites also
helps confronting the scepticism put forward by cultural relativists, claiming that any
universal standard of well-being is a parochial expression of Western culture and
values. One consequence of cultural relativism is that it becomes very difficult to find
a universal standard in order to judge the justice of the global economic and political
order. If “harm” were defined without any reference to universal categories (such as
Nussbaum’s “central human functional capabilities”) it would be easy for better-off
societies’ to lean back and argue that many people in developing countries are
actually quite satisfied with their deprived capability sets. Being illiterate because
one’s society cannot provide a state-funded educational system might count as an
instance of severe deprivation in a highly developed society but not in most sub-
Saharan states.
Here I agree again with Nussbaum’s criticism of “adaptive preferences”. Her
examples of women in India show that a more objective standard is needed to judge
whether a society can provide an environment allowing for the equal and general
possession of central capabilities for all society members.89 It remains, however, a
challenge to capability approaches, as well as to my basic needs cosmopolitanism, to
find a reasonable balance between universal basic requirements of what makes a life
truly human and the capability list’s “multiple realizability” allowing for local
specifications. An answer to these questions cannot be given by the philosopher
alone. What is important for philosophical approaches to development is to maintain
an attitude of confidence that minimal requirements of what basic needs are can be
formulated in the course of an interdisciplinary discourse. In the preceding sections on
Nussbaum I admitted that her list might include too many controversial capabilities
that cannot obtain global agreement. I have, however, also expressed my belief that
her list includes the minimal elements of human lives that are of cross-cultural
significance.
Basic needs cosmopolitanism starts from the assumption according to which
such a core of universal basic needs can be identified. These needs are derived from a
list of central human functional capabilities and from reflection upon the question of
what overall social, economic and political condition a society must be in, in order to
enable its citizens to possess these capabilities. My resulting theory of global
obligations relies on the idea that global economic and political institutions and
arrangements can be judged by examining what impact they have on these core needs
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for basic necessities and just domestic institutions the satisfaction of which are the
two necessary prerequisite for possessing the related central capabilities. The fact that
a variant of Sen’s capability approach is now successfully deployed in the United
Nations’ Human Development Reports as a respected method of comparing living
standards is an additional incentive to take capabilities and functionings as the starting
point when thinking about global distributive justice. My approach has tried to
establish the link between “capabilities”, “needs” and “justice” by means of the
concept of “harm” and defends the claim that capabilities count as basic ones when
not possessing them constitutes an instance of bodily or mental damage and cases of
deprivation that have long-term effects on the agents rational agency. Since even
libertarian sceptics about social and economic rights agree that actively harming
someone is the violation of a universal negative obligation I hope to have shown that
imposing a global order that harms people by rendering the satisfaction of basic needs
impossible or difficult counts as an injustice and generates justice-based obligations
of compensation.
This essay has been concerned with this type of obligations of distributive
justice only (type A). Compensation can be the result of other patterns of international
conduct as well. My coordinate grid of global obligations, presented in the general
introduction to this essay, is intended to remind us that coercion, deception, fraud etc.
also generate justice-based obligations to compensate (type B) for violations of
negative obligations (“not to coerce”, “not to deceive”, etc.). In addition, this essay
has not addressed questions of what better-off societies are required to do about
severe poverty (type C) and global inequality (type D) in case they have not
contributed to these dire straits at all. I believe that a strong rationale can be construed
for, at least, category C, i.e. beneficence-based obligations to meet basic needs. (But
my opinion is, of course, not an argument.) I am more sceptical about applying ideals
and principles of full-fledged egalitarianism, as we know it from theories of domestic
social and economic justice, to the global level. I was not able to deal with these
issues here, and their satisfying examination requires much philosophical work,
especially on the arguments in favour of establishing a substantial difference between
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what egalitarian justice demands in the case of liberal society’s domestic institutions
in contrast to a just global order.90
The demandingness of basic needs cosmopolitanism is restricted in two ways:
firstly, the justice-based obligations of global redistribution - again, we are only
considering category A of my coordinate grid - cannot ask the better-off for more
compensation than mirrors their responsibility for basic needs deficits that are due to
the global order or other multilateral arrangements. The highest possible transfers the
obligation of justice to meet basic needs can ask the better-off to arrange are transfers
in proportion to a 100% responsibility for these deficits in basic necessities. Secondly,
since even Pogge admits that the problem of world poverty is a combination of global
and local factors91 the compensation the better-off are required to transfer to poor
countries will not be in proportion to a maximum 100% responsibility. Instead they
are asked to discharge a combination of compensation on grounds of justice and what
is normally regarded as development assistance based on beneficence – if a proper
rationale for beneficence-based moral obligations can be developed.
Obligations of beneficence are also moral requirements and their stringency
depends on their underlying rationale, which I have not sketched in this essay. In the
case of the combined picture of distributive obligations the question of excessive
demandingness only applies to the second, beneficence-related, portion. I am making
a normative, as opposed to a descriptive, claim here. As a matter of fact, the justice-
based portion can be very demanding, i.e. asking the better-off for a huge quantity of
compensatory transfers. The same can be true of the beneficence-based portion. The
important difference is that considerations of demandingness should be allowed to
play a role in the better-off’s moral deliberations only within the context of
beneficence. This is a corollary of the claim I established in chapter one: What
distinguishes obligations of justice from obligations of beneficence is a different level
of stringency. As long as we are debating transfers within the framework of justice
the better-off’s complaint about overly demanding sacrifices that result from
90 The current debate in response to Blake’s (2001) and Nagel’s (2005) essays are concerned with
drawing this distinction between domestic egalitarianism and global sufficinism. For responses to
Nagel see Cohen/Sabel 2006 and Julius 2006.
91 Pogge 2002, p. 112. Even though Pogge accepts local factors such as a country’s history, its culture
and its environment as reasons for poverty he assigns a large responsibility for these “local” problems
to the global order. These responsibilities have to be mirrored in the better-off’s obligations towards
poor societies. My focus in this dissertation has however been on the global order’s effects caused by
the institutional and legal arrangements structuring global trade and politics.
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discharging this global obligation lacks the justificatory force we grant in the
framework of obligations of beneficence. My discussion of Singer’s consequentialist
approach to global redistribution criticized his approach because of its mere focus on
beneficence. Since consequentialism neglects the question of why the poor are in the
dire straits they currently are, its focus on beneficence generates the worries about
overly demanding sacrifices. It has been one of this essay’s major objectives to depict
the shortcomings of consequentialist and utilitarian approaches to global
redistribution. A mere focus on the current state of the world and the resulting
normative claim requiring the better-off to transfer as much as possible because it
generates the highest aggregated level of well-being has been rejected because of the
weight I assign to the question of whether and to what extent the better-off share some
responsibility for the current state of the world and the desperate situation of the
poor.92
It has been Pogge’s achievement to direct the debates about global distributive
justice into a direction that pays attention to the insight that global redistribution is not
only a matter of beneficence, let alone mere supererogation and charity.93 My
“intuitions” about global justice and about the impact the better-off’s responsibilities
have on justifying global obligations, that I tried to transform into a theory, have been
strongly influenced by Pogge’s ideas. The major objective of this dissertation has to a
large extent been to evaluate the impact of one of Pogge’s major ideas on the
categorisation of global obligations requiring the better-off to do something
substantially about global poverty and inequality. This idea is that the better-off’s
imposing and upholding of an unjust global order constitutes the violation of the
92 It might well be that consequentialism turns out to provide the superior rationale for global
obligations within categories C and D of my grid. My criticism remains valid though, because a mere
consequentialist approach to the problem of global justice has difficulties in drawing a distinction
between categories C and D on the one hand and categories A and B on the other. It has been this
Poggean distinction that I have taken as one of the most important starting points for establishing basic
needs cosmopolitanism.
93 When reading my dissertation readers might be tempted to think that I use the term “beneficence” in
an almost “amoral” way, i.e. as being located outside the realm of moral obligations altogether. This
impression would be a misunderstanding of my project of drawing a sharp distinction between the
spheres of justice and beneficence. Obligations of justice and obligations of beneficence are both moral
obligations in the sense that people failing to discharge them are blameworthy. The same is not true in
the case of supererogatory action. My aim has been to flesh out an intuition according to which the
obligations of justice asking for positive action on the part of the obligation bearer gain their special
moral stringency because of the preceding violation of negative obligations in Pogge’s sense. The
imposition of an unjust (because “harmful”) global order is such a violation of a negative obligation. It
generates obligations that are of a different stringency than other moral obligations asking better-off
parties to help the worse-off if they can do so within a certain limit of sacrifices.
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negative obligation, not to inflict avoidable harm on others. I have deviated from
Pogge in determining what properties render the global order into an unjust one. I
replaced his threshold of social and economic human rights with one of basic needs
which were in turn identified by asking what the prerequisites for universally
approved human functional capabilities are.
Pogge is right when he emphasises his theory’s element asking better-off
societies to stop the violation of a negative obligation. He convincingly argues that “a
more poverty-avoiding alternative design of the global institutional order [is
possible], [and] that the present design is unjust and that, by imposing it, we are
harming the global poor by foreseeably subjecting them to avoidable severe
poverty.”94 Actively working towards institutional reforms and imposing pressure on
their democratically elected political representatives are only two options citizens of
better-off societies can engage in to contribute to this process of stopping the
continuation of living as part of a global system that contributes to people not being
able to meet their most basic needs. Another criticism of Pogge’s and my theories of
global justice might be put forward at this point. It is problematic and implausible, the
critic claims, to assign an equal degree of responsibility to each better-off state or
even to each of its citizens. Why should democratic societies’ ordinary citizens share
the same amount of responsibility to compensate for global injustices as do their
elected representatives and non-elected business executives? In addition, poverty is
rare in High Income Countries but not completely eradicated. Moreover, these
“wealthy poor” are often themselves victims of global economic developments.
This objection is not easily confronted. The reality is certainly more complex
than my simplified percentage-style assignment of responsibilities suggests. Such an
assignment will not be possible in the case of comparing societies and this will not be
easier in the case of individual citizens within wealthy societies. Pogge is aware of
these shortcomings of the responsibility-story as well.95 It is certainly not possible to
sharply assign responsibilities to the better-off on one side and declare the poor mere
victims on the other. Within better-off societies many people, often women, suffer
from the effects of global developments. Are these “better-off poor” imposing an
unjust global order on themselves then; an order that is to their own disadvantage?
Pogge is right when he reminds the critic that his approach to global responsibilities
94 Pogge 2005a, p. 55. My emphasis.
95 Pogge replying at a conference in Edinburgh 5/2006.
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does by no means imply that “a single jobless mother in Harlem”96 shares the same
level of responsibility for not doing anything about reforming the global order, and
bringing to broader attention the current state of affairs, as does a globally acting top
manager or politician.
I want to add, however, that the idea of democracy would become a very weak
one if this relativising of responsibilities is done too extensively. Without being able
to examine these issues here, I should claim that there must be something seriously
wrong with democratic legitimacy if democratic citizens are so badly informed about
public affairs and global injustices that they can be released from any responsibilities
whatsoever for whom they vote for and therefore be declared absolute non-
contributors in imposing an unjust global order. The better-off’s democracies would
then be a farce and certainly not a political ideal worth fighting wars for, or worth
being promoted in distant countries by military and diplomatic means. The critic is,
however, right in pointing towards the importance of differentiating levels of
responsibility and levels of what impact global obligations should be allowed to have
on ordinary citizens’ lives.
In this essay my focus has been lying on one out of four categories of global
obligations. This obligation of justice, based on basic needs deficits, can be regarded
as another normative consequence resulting from Pogge’s theory of global justice, a
consequence Pogge himself pays insufficient attention to. I should stress my
agreement with Pogge’s main idea according to which stopping the imposition of an
unjust global order is one major aspect of the better-off’s obligations. In addition,
however, the past and continuing effects of harm-generating global institutions and
arrangements ask the parties responsible for and profiting from them to do more than
just stopping their imposition. One of Pogge’s major motivations for introducing the
idea that the better-off in fact violate a negative obligation not to harm the poor has
been to criticize the long lasting dominance of declaring debates about global justice
to take place within the framework of positive obligations only. Pogge does not deny
that there are such positive obligations to help the poor. My discussion of Peter Singer
in chapter one showed that these positive obligations to help the poor can be very
demanding. I agree with Pogge, however, that all these approaches have neglected the
fact that the violation of the negative obligation not to harm someone carries with it
96 Ibid.
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the moral stringency that, unfortunately, seems to be required to make better-off
citizens and their politicians really think and do something about global poverty.
Global justice is not so much about doing good but about not doing wrong.
My category of obligations of justice is what Pogge calls a “positive duty”. It
asks better-off societies to do something, namely to transfer parts of their wealth to
the poor. These transfers are, however, not a matter of charity. They are, as far as
certain empirical claims about the global order’s negative effects are true, also not a
matter of beneficence-based obligations. What I tried to show in this essay is that
some “positive duties” can have the stringency Pogge thinks is only a property of
negative duties. I establish this claim by assigning an obligation of distributive justice
to preceding violations of negative obligations. If the better-off have been harming the
poor then the stringency of the violated negative obligation spills over to the related
requirements of compensation. I therefore argue in favour of a more evenly balanced
picture concerning the two elements in Pogge’s theory: not imposing an unjust global
order on the poor by inflicting harm on them (the negative duty) is a demand of
justice. The compensation for this imposition, however, must not be neglected just
because it is a positive obligation. In addition, this picture is attractive to extreme
libertarians. Rectification for past and present failures to fulfil negative obligations is
a demand of justice. What I want to emphasise is that this rectification requires the
obligation bearers to “actively do something” and that this activity-feature renders the
requirement to compensate into a “positive” obligation. In this restricted sense of
“positive” also libertarians are (when certain empirical assumptions are true)
committed to accepting some positive obligations on part of the better-off. This
restricted sense of “positive” is, however, strong enough in order to support my
conclusions about global distributive justice defended in this essay.
Critics of basic needs cosmopolitanism might point towards another
shortcoming. Not only is basic needs cosmopolitanism an incomplete theory with
regard to the four redistributive obligations distinguished at the outset of this essay -
only the category of redistributive obligations of justice related to basic needs deficits
is discussed here. Even the four categories taken together, the critic continues, do not
give a complete and useful picture of what better-off societies should do about global
injustice. Even worse, basic needs cosmopolitanism’s resemblance to traditional
development approaches, focusing on financial- and resource-transfers, expresses its
adherence to an outdated and unsuccessful, paradigm of international development.
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Already the nineteen fifties’ failure to stimulate third world economies’ “take-off” by
means of (half-hearted) financial transfers towards these countries’ elites did not only
not improve these countries’ situation but rendered them worse-off overall. Capital
transfers got stuck and were wasted with corrupt local elites, using these transfers to
entertain militias or spending them on personal luxuries. No such thing as a “trickle
down effect” took place. Basic needs cosmopolitanism commits the same mistake,
asking the better-off to transfer compensation unconditionally to ruling elites thereby
worsening the situation of the countries’ poor citizens.
At this point it is important to point towards the incompleteness of basic needs
cosmopolitanism. As mentioned above, transfers on grounds of justice are a necessary
but certainly not a sufficient means to equip a poor society with an environment that
allows its citizens to possess central human functional capabilities. I repeatedly
stressed the importance of the capabilities’ non-material prerequisites such as
institutional reforms and democratization. It is in fact the case, as Pogge’s empirical
observations show, that better-off states are required on grounds of justice to assist
poor societies with providing these political and social prerequisites. Justifying these
obligations requires a lot more work than just applying the rationale for basic needs
cosmopolitanism, as presented in this essay, to these issues. Support for poor
countries’ domestic institutional reforms broaches a number of intricate issues
reaching from paternalism over the respect for national self-determination to the
problem of military humanitarian intervention by the better-off states. At this point I
can only stress that basic needs cosmopolitanism does not exclude stringent
international obligations to assist in establishing just domestic institutions. Basic
needs cosmopolitanism is definitely sensitive to the fact that material transfers alone
cannot be the solution to the problems of global development.
Let us conclude with a final, realistic and honest, statement about this essay’s
objectives; a statement that might seem disappointing and provoke criticisms
especially from people involved in more practical endeavours concerned with global
development. Basic needs cosmopolitanism cannot be applied to the practices of
developmental policies in the form of a master plan guiding political and economic
action regardless of each particular case’s special features. It would be naïve to
believe that responsibilities and the corresponding extent of compensatory obligations
can be determined within a percentage scale in real world cases. It might also turn out
that the obligations to meet others’ basic needs do in fact interfere with our affluent
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lives so much that they cannot be implemented by means of democratic elections in
which citizens vote primarily to protect their more immediate interests.
If it turned out that all this and other practical limitations are in fact the case
this does not mean that basic needs cosmopolitanism is an ill-conceived moral-
philosophical theory, however. The initial objective of this essay has been to get
clearer about some important conceptual differentiations. The moral philosophical
exercise performed here has examined the differences between and the relationship
among moral obligations based on “justice” and the ones based on “beneficence”. It
has tried to establish a standard for identifying the global order as “unjust” by means
of the concept of “harm”. The latter was in turn related to “basic needs” which were
derived form a list of universal human functional capabilities. I am confident that
these adjustments on the conceptual level, however, do not generate consequences on
a semantic level alone. That the academic debates about world poverty have been
dominated by notions such as “charity” and “beneficence” was not only relevant for
the theoretical discussions of global ethics. A shift towards the idea of “justice” is not
only a re-labelling of this same old debate; it can be the starting point of a more
widespread remodelling of the categorical framework within which affluent citizens
and their politicians judge their acts, and the consequences of those acts. These, more
fine-grained, normative judgments about our globally effective actions might well
initiate a shift in our actual responses to these actions and consequently have an
impact on the morality of our future actions. If this essay has contributed at least
something to clarifying this framework of normative categories, it has achieved a lot.
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